UNITED NATIONS MULTI-PARTNER TRUST FUND

Reconciliation Stabilization Resilience

Area Based Programming (ABP)

Jonglei State and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY PROJECT DOCUMENT

ANNEX 1: RSRTF AREA-BASED PROGRAMME RESULTS FRAMEWORK TEMPLATE

ANNEX 2: RSRTF AREA-BASED PROGRAMME WORKPLAN TEMPLATE

ANNEX 3: RSRTF AREA-BASED PROGRAMME FINANCIAL PROPOSAL TEMPLATE

Note: Please do not remove orange guidance prompts.

MPTFO PROJECT CODE:	*To be completed by the Secretariat*
GRANT RECIPIENT ORGANISATION:	The UN World Food Programme (WFP)
PARTICIPATING RECIPIENT ORGS.:	*Names of all partner organisations* *Indicate status of HACT approval (for NGO applicants only)* 1. International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) | United Nations Police (UNPOL) [Strategic Partner] 3. United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) | Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)/HRD [Strategic Partner] 4. UNMISS [Rule of Law and Advisory Section (RoLAS) | Civil Affairs Division (CAD) [Strategic Partner] 5. Peace Canal 6. Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) 7. Save the Children International (SCI) 8. Vétérinaires Sans Frontières - Germany (VSF-G)
PROJECT TITLE:	*Give your project a specific title, to accurately reflect the purpose and key locations where you intend to undertake your activities.* Community Violence Reduction (CVR) in central-southern Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) - Phase II
LOCATION:	*Provide detailed locations of planned interventions. A map depicting the target locations must be provided as an annex.* Central-southern Jonglei and GPAA: Weikol-Pulbura, Kadiang, Nanaam-Bichbich-Keriak-Kotome-Wuno-Lekuangole, Burmath-Nyandit, Anyidi-Manyabol-Gumuruk corridors.

RELEVANT RSRTF OUTCOME(S):	*Select all relevant outcomes from the RSRTF Results Framework.* OUTCOME 1: (REDUCED VIOLENCE) Individuals, particularly children and women, are facing less violence at the community and local level. OUTCOME 2: (INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT) Communities have effective mechanisms in place that meaningfully include women and youth to resolve conflicts peacefully. OUTCOME 3: (ACCOUNTABILITY & RULE OF LAW) A strong and integrated justice chain offers lawful redress for victims and trust exists between citizens and state security apparatus, justice, and law enforcement institutions. OUTCOME 4: (CIVIC PARTICIPATION & GOVERNANCE) Government is accountable, transparent, and responsive, and citizens, including women, youth and disadvantaged groups, exercise their rights to meaningfully participate in public debate and civic engagement. OUTCOME 5: (HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT) Individuals and youth are empowered and incentivized to shift from violence and criminality as a means of economic survival to productive participation in socio-economic processes. OUTCOME 6: (PEACE DIVIDENDS) Reconciled communities enjoy socio-economic improvements that increase interdependency, social cohesion and self-reliance and mitigate catalysts of violent resource-based competition.	
UNCF PRIORITY AREA(S) THE PROGRAMME CONTRIBUTES TO:	PRIORITY AREA I: BUILDING PEACE AND STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE PRIORITY AREA IV: EMPOWERING WOMEN AND YOUTH	
PLANNED PROGRAMME DURATION:	24 MONTHS	START DATE: 1 April 2023 END DATE: 31 March 2025

PROGRAMME SUMMARY

Provide a brief summary of the planned programme incorporating the following information:

(Max 1 page)

(a) Primary outcome or expected change to be delivered

The Area Based Programming (ABP) for Phase II will build on the results and lessons of Phase I, to reduce intra- and inter-communal violence, strengthening safety and security as a foundation for longer term development. Socially and demographically, the programme will evolve its approach to the strategic targeting of youth (including armed youth and cattle camp youth), age-set groups, inter- and intra-, spiritual leaders. Structurally, it will focus on supporting communities to strengthen both pre-existing and nascent mechanisms for peaceful community governance, and their relation to local and state authorities; strengthening a local mandate with respect to reconciliation, stabilisation and resilience. Thematically, the ABP will focus on improved sociological understanding, concrete and credible accountability measures, leveraging the role of women, strengthening communications quality externally, as well as internal coordination and coherence within the ABP and with strategic partners. By the conclusion of the programme, the programme expects to have a more granular and instructive understanding of socio-economic incentive structures, a functional Community Partnership Agreement with differentiated responsibilities and accountability (including emerging justice measures and stronger relations between communities and government), and a more systematic program of engagement among women's groups.

(b) Phase I achievements in terms of stability gains to be built upon / consolidated (explain in terms of changes seen/reported in the community rather than listing outputs of phase I)

During Phase 01, there was significant reduction in violence in Jonglei and GPAA, until the outbreak of further violence in December 2022. The initial progress was attributed in part to the investment of the ABP and ARG in ongoing processes such the Pieri Peace Agreement of March 2021, follow up peace dialogues as well as shuttle diplomacy. The independent evaluation established the community's appreciation of the impact of asset creation in targeted fragile locations. In addition, existing community mechanisms were strengthened to resolve disputes and mitigate intra-communal violence. As a result of persistent mediation and peace messaging, key influencers exhibited tremendous forbearance and resistance to mass mobilisation for inter-communal violence. There were interludes of peace and stability in locations where interventions were implemented. The fluctuations witnessed were influenced mostly by random and spontaneous incidents of insecurity, which washed away the gains made in trust building among communities across borders such as Anyidi and Gumuruk, Lekuangole and Akobo East, Kadiang and Pulbura. Nevertheless, interventions were to a great extent skewed towards areas that are not considered conflict hotspots, mostly due to factors that negatively impacted access and the enabling environment for community outreach and implementation. The causes and implications of the December 2022 violence are discussed in detail further below.

(c) Briefly note the key contextuol and outstanding substantive issues that the programme needs to address to achieve the violence reduction outcome (this should explain in brief why phase II is required)

The seasonal and cyclical recapitulation of inter-communal violence in Jonglei is linked to persistent cattle raiding and abduction of children and women by suspected armed youth from GPAA – often referred to as criminals by GPAA local authorities – followed by mobilization of central-southern Jonglei youth for revenge attacks on Pibor. This is exacerbated by the proliferation of small and light weapons (SALWs). These factors remain the main threat to stability and peace in the region. During Phase I, ABP and ARG partners made inroads into some of the areas deemed strategic to addressing the root causes of inter-communal violence in Jonglei and GPAA. The established community governance structures were supported to reach out to Murle age-set groups in Wuno and assessments were conducted in Kadiang. However, the design of phase I was not flexible enough to adapt interventions to the evolving context. Phase II will therefore adopt a more focused, dynamic, flexible and agile approach, including integrating a crisis modifier fund and more dynamic political engagement and community outreach strategies tapping into the resources and capabilities of strategic partners. Quarterly programme reviews are included in the programme design to ensure that lessons learned, and insights gained during implementation are continuously incorporated into the design and implementation of subsequent interventions.

(d) Explain the target groups that will be engaged and the selected locations for focussing activities

Successful programme strategies from Phase I will form the basis for the Phase II programme design and implementation including adopting improved strategies based on lessons learned. The main target groups will be women and youth, (in particular armed youth, cattle camp youth and Murle age-set groups) in four corridors including Kadiang, Weikol-Pulbura, Nyandit-Burmath-Lekuangole, Nanaam-Bichbich-Kerjak-Kotome-Wuno and Anyidi-Manyabol-Gumuruk. The programme design incorporates conflict sensitivity and risk mitigation strategies to manage the sensitivities associated with venturing into these new isolated and marginalized locations and minimize unintended impacts of the interventions on the populations. This is fully in line with the RSRTF Fund's support for innovations designed as catalytic interventions that bear positive results in community violence reduction.

(e) Summarise the key components of the intervention strategy, how these align to the triple nexus concept and why such an approach is relevant in the target area(s)

Phase II ABP strategies are well aligned with the three RSRTF thematic areas: Reconciliation, Stabilization and Resilience.

The Reconciliation Pillar has five pathways: (a) Reinforcing the Pieri process architecture, with renewed emphasis on stakeholder responsibilities for implementation and consequences for non-implementation; (b) Strengthening capabilities of local inter-communal and local peace structures governance mechanisms; (c) Supporting mediation of local-level conflicts and implementation of local peace processes; (d) Abductions prevention and response; (e) Rapid response to avert mobilization and escalation of violence unforeseen threats to stability of the operating environment.

The Stabilization Pillar also has three pathways: (a) Strengthening community dispute resolution and building linkages between the informal and formal justice systems; (b) Enhancing accountable and responsible community-led local governance mechanisms; (c) Advocacy.

The Resilience Pillar has four pathways: (a) Community assets in conflict hotspots; (b) Livelihood support, including for alternative livelihoods, for armed youth and women in conflict hotspots; (c) Informal learning opportunities for armed youth and cattle camps: 'Learning Together – Growing together' Peace and Life-skills Development; (d) Local capacity for resource management.

The Programme level will integrate the threads, with a focus on three tracks: (a) Redesigned coordination and internal accountability system; (b) ARG and State/Local Government coordination; (c) Community engagement and monitoring

mechanism. This ABP approaches the triple nexus holistically, both directly and indirectly. The engagement of partners with mandates covering the full HDP ambit means that their wider programming can leverage the coherence strengthening function of the ABP. For example, whilst humanitarian partners on the programme are not delivering strictly humanitarian inputs under the ABP, the experience of Phase 1 shows that the coordination around the ABP also leads to strengthened coherence in their fulfilment of the separate humanitarian mandate. The ABP convening and coordination space, in other words, leads to better coordination not only on programme activities, but better coordination between project partners and other Area Reference Group partners, in general across the entirety of the HDP nexus. Within the programme, the nexus is more focussed on the Peacebuilding-Development vector. Even there, the logic is not that the ABP is a 'development' programme, but that it is laying sufficient foundations for a more comprehensive development agenda, dovetailed through a carefully iterated exit strategy that closely involves communities and government.

Overall, with respect to the triple nexus, the ABP adopts an inclusive and comprehensive approach to HDP, with a potential to support HDP coherence by functioning as a node in the wider HDP networked landscape.



(f) Highlight specific actions and elements of the approach planned for phase II which are geared toward ensuring a level of sustainability of the action.

Phase II will continue building on Phase I's bottom-up approach with a focus on strengthening existing community mechanisms, including the women-youth-chiefs-led intercommunal governance structures. The programme will also leverage the capacity of locally recruited national staff who have deeper insider appreciation of the volatility, unpredictability, complexity, and ambiguity of the context and equip them with requisite skills on how to continue supporting the community mechanisms and governance structures. Although local government institutions are weak and have a high turnover, the programme will continue to leverage the goodwill of state and local government officials who are positively inclined to its objectives. The programme will engage them through strategic partners and in compliance with humanitarian principles to advance the agenda of violence reduction and promoting stable and peaceful conditions for sustainable development.

PROGRAMME SIGNATURES

(To be completed by the Secretariat after SC approval)

RECIPIENT ORGANISATION (WFP):	RECIPIENT ORGANISATION / MANAGING AGENT (UNDP):
WFP Adeyinka Badejo Deputy Country Director – Operations UN WFP South Sudan Signature:	United Nations Development Programme South Sudan UNDP
RECIPIENT ORGANISATION (UNMISS):	RECIPIENT ORGANISATION (IOM):
UNMISS	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION IOM - OIM JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN
RECIPIENT ORGANISATION (UNHCR):	
UNITED NATIONS SOUTH SUDAN UNHCR COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 05	

RSRTF STEERING COMMITTEE CHAIR:	FUND SECRETARIAT:
	

PROGRAMME MANAGER CONTACT DETAILS:

Lawrence Peter, RSRTF Project Coordinator, Lawrence.peter@wfp.org +211929700780

TOTAL PROGRAMME BUDGET	
CATEGORIES	AMOUNT (USD)
1. Staff and other personnel costs	2,715,724
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	2,994,340
3. Equipment, Vehicles and Furniture including Depreciation	93,560
4. Contractual Services	648,562
5. Travel	537,391
6. Transfers and Grants Counterparts	7,665,191
7. General Operating and Other Direct Costs	790,234
Sub-Total Project Costs	**15,445,002**
8. Indirect support costs	**1,054,295**
PROJECT TOTAL	**16,499,297**

BUDGET PER GRANT RECIPIENT ORGANIZATION					
CATEGORIES	WFP	UNDP	IOM	UNMISS	UNHCR
1. Staff and other personnel costs	935,378	276,000	616,546	803,800	84,000
2. Supplies, Commodities, Materials	2,625,740	306,600	52,000	10,000	-
3. Equipment, Vehicles and Furniture including Depreciation	-	34,560	9,000	-	50,000
4. Contractual Services	58,500	-	402,062	163,000	25,000
5. Travel	133,416	132,000	28,504	214,940	28,531
6. Transfers and Grants Counterparts	1,019,978	6,645,213	-	-	-
7. General Operating and Other Direct Costs	118,767	304,656	74,811	-	292,000
Sub-Total Project Costs	**4,891,779**	**7,699,029**	**1,182,923**	**1,191,740**	**479,531**
8. Indirect support costs	**317,966**	**538,932**	**82,805**	**83,422**	**31,170**
PROJECT TOTAL	**5,209,745**	**8,237,961**	**1,265,728**	**1,275,162**	**510,701**

1. CONTEXT ANALYSIS

Outline the context in which the project implementation will take place. Summarise the economic, social, political, security and institutional context of the area and explain how this may have a bearing on the proposed interventions. Explain how the context and security situation in the area have changed, if at all, during phase I implementation of the Jonglei-GPAA RSRTF area-based programme. Highlight what contextual issues pose a possible threat to the stability gains achieved to date.

Summary Phase I Context

The subregion of Jonglei State and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) in South Sudan continues to experience inter- and intra-communal conflict and organised violence. Endemic conflict and violence are characterised by deliberate attacks on civilians and their livelihoods. This violence is within and between communities. The proliferation of small arms following decades of the civil war and armed conflict has reduced the power of local authorities whilst military and political actors – motivated by rivalries and/or economic interests – have at times made cattle raids and abduction of women and children into a tool of political violence. Persistent communal violence, compounded by climatic shocks – the worst flooding in almost 60 years – and limited investments in infrastructure and services, renders Jonglei and GPAA a focal point of communal violence, hunger and poverty in the country.

The last seven years were marked by political violence associated with the 2013 civil war. However, sub-national and grassroot layers of violence – for instance mobilisation of the Lou Nuer White Army against the Murle and violence between Murle age-sets – existed before, during, and parallel to the civil war, with certain layers of violence predating even the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the two Sudanese Civil Wars. As of August 2020, violence associated with the civil war had largely ended in Jonglei.

Nevertheless, the involvement of security forces on both sides of the current conflict reflects growing divisions within the incumbent government. Furthermore, the absence of effective governance at the state and local level has led to the manipulation and instrumentalisation of ethnic and sub-ethnic identities and mobilisation of groups such as the Bor Youth and the Lou Nuer White Army around political and violent objectives. In the absence of effective governance, security, and justice systems, the White Army has remained a primary security actor in Lou Nuer territories with the capacity to rapidly mobilise division-size forces.

Despite several efforts to end cycles of women and child abductions and inter-communal violence, the overall situation of the Jonglei and GPAA sub-region remains fragile. Continued support to advance the implementation of the Pieri resolutions is critical to building confidence in the peace process and preventing the reversal of the gains made. The proliferation of small arms following decades of armed conflict has reduced the power of local authorities.

In Phase I of the RSRTF Jonglei/GPAA Area Based Programme (ABP), the conflict dynamics increased the scale, scope, and complexity of the population needs. However, while the immediate needs for humanitarian support and protection remained high, linking such efforts to longer term stabilisation, reconciliation, and resilience activities was crucial, including through effective mechanisms to strengthen access to justice and break entrenched cycles of impunity.

Safety and security assessments conducted according to the Measuring Safety and Security (MSS) methodology in 2021/22 indicated a significant reduction in violence in the area compared to the previous years, even when accounting for the December 2022 mobilisation. This was attributed to several factors including efforts made by peacebuilding partners to de-escalate tensions and mobilization of armed youth in 2021 and 2022. Building on these gains and taking into account lessons learned from past interventions, ABP Phase II will continue to address the root causes of conflict, violence and marginalisation to shift the incentives for violence through strengthened community structures, formal and informal justice systems, and livelihood opportunities to facilitate a transition to a more stable future.

Pre-December 2022 Security Situation

Since the signing of the Pieri Peace Agreement in March 2021 between Dinka Bor[1], Lou Nuer, and Murle, relationships among the parties to the agreement have been progressively characterized by increased resilience to conflict triggers in Lou Nuer and Dinka Bor areas. Substantial progress has been made in violence reduction including collection and return of abducted women and children especially on the Lou Nuer and Murle sides until the last quarter of 2022.

However, in April 2021, approximately 2,000 primarily Gawaar Nuer from Ayod launched an organized attack towards GPAA, in part ostensibly due to their non-inclusion in the Pieri agreement, but driven equally by localised dynamics and the incentives of the spiritual leadership of Makuach. Against this changing backdrop, the Area Reference Group (ARG) supported the follow-up to address concerns, reaffirm commitment to the agreement, and include the Gawaar Nuer community within the process, capitalizing on existing intercommunal governance structures foreseen by the Agreement.

Another tangible progress made since the signing of the agreement was the possibility for youth traders to extend their business to other areas. However, its implementation remained challenging. In June 2021, in response to the assassination of a Lou Nuer youth trader in Pibor, three Murle traders were killed in Akobo. Compensation efforts led by local authorities in Pibor towards the family of the late Lou Nuer trader were unsuccessful. Fifty cows for blood compensation and assets of the late trader were confiscated by a group of armed youth from Munchak. Due to the rainy season and change of leadership in Lekuangole, the issue was left unresolved. However, the case was reopened in June 2022 during a women's peace conference in Akobo. The Commissioners of Akobo and Lekuangole have signed an agreement to collect the cows and guns and hand them over to the family of the late Lou Nuer youth trader. As of December, 40 cows out of 58 and 13 guns out of 25 have been collected by the Commissioner of Lekuangole and will be transported to Akobo in the dry season.

A major breakdown in the peace agreement took place in November 2021 when two Bor Dinka youth travelling on motorbike to Anyidi Payam were ambushed by suspected armed youth from GPAA. In revenge, youth from Anyidi Payam killed 7 Murle residing in Bor town. Subsequently, alleged armed youth from Manyabol and Kelero Payams in Gumuruk County attacked Baidit Payam in the northern part of Bor claiming the lives of 33 people, according to a mission report by the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG). As a result, the Bor-Pibor road was made inaccessible by Dinka Bor youth for humanitarian and commercial vehicles,

[1] The implications of recent internal divisions among Dinka of Greater Bor regarding group identity(ies), naming and organisation need to be re-assessed so that agencies ensure they are using the most conflict sensitive (with respect to all sides) terms. Where possible, administrative categorisations should be used (Duk, Twic East, Bor South).

affecting the delivery of goods and services to GPAA throughout 2022. It also led to Dinka Bor withdrawing from the Kongor Dialogue on 22-26 November and the Inter-Communal Governance Structures meeting in Pibor town on 18-20 December.

For the Lou Nuer and Murle, the first half of 2022 remained stable as a result of strengthened engagement by ARG partners on both sides. Conversely, the Dinka Bor remained tense especially due to rumoured mass mobilization that resulted in residents of Bichbich along the Nanaam area moving to Gumuruk and Pibor to ensure their safety. In July 2022, small-scale cattle raids, killings on the road, and abduction of women and children continued to take place along the border between Lou Nuer and Murle communities. Incidents were allegedly perpetrated by armed Murle youth from GPAA.

On November 11, triangulated reports from multiple sources on the ground and in Juba confirmed that the Lou Nuer spiritual leader Dak Kueth had conducted a ritual that marks the start of mobilization. A joint mission by the Jonglei state authorities and ARG Partners (WFP, Peace Canal, and NP) was conducted in Partet Payam in Uror County to engage Dak Kueth, traditional leaders, and the youth on November 14-18 to dissuade the mobilization.

However, exactly two weeks after, another mobilization was coordinated by Lou Nuer armed youth leader Reath. Dak Kueth authorised the mobilisation, though subsequent community engagement indicates that – despite the scapegoating of the spiritual leader – a threshold of community support is necessary before Dak Kueth will countenance an attack. Continued sporadic attacks perpetrated by Murle youth in November were perceived to be the main motivation for the mobilization. Other ground sources suggested that there was pressure amongst the armed youth that their leaders were expected to act or would have been removed from their position. This mobilization effort was conveyed across as far as Duk and Greater Ulang in Upper Nile. And there are subsisting economic drivers of violence, in the absence of other livelihood opportunities.

Intra-communal conflict Dynamics

Defections from one age-set group or sub-group to another caused significant tensions between the age-sets in Pibor, Lekuangole, and Gumuruk counties in GPAA, leading to violent interactions among Tithi, Bothonya, Lango, Kurenen, and Guzuli age-set groups during 2022. In March 2022, Peace Canal and NP conducted a series of inter-Murle age-set youth conferences to foster peace and reconciliation among the age-set groups across GPAA areas. Although age-set fighting with use of gun has reduced mainly in towns, violence remains a key issue in interior bomas, especially areas that are inaccessible during the rainy season. These include Kongor, Wuno, and Munchak of Lekuangole County, Thangiang, Kelero, and Bichbich in Gumuruk County, and Manyirany, Beeh, and Akilo in Pibor County. The gradual emergence of new age sets is another dynamic that can lead to conflict. Although the severity of these conflicts can be aggravated with modern weaponry, the social processes are not new.[2]

Criminal activities and general violence characterized by physical assaults, robbery, and targeted killings have been a common occurrence in Pibor since the beginning of the 2022 rainy season. Multiple incidents of thefts, armed robberies on the river, and intrusions at compounds belonging to humanitarian organizations have also been observed with at least four INGO boats stopped and threatened on the river, and four reports of compound intrusions. Reports indicated that humanitarian organizations were targeted.

In Lou Nuer areas, intra-communal conflict between different Lou Nuer sub-clans had claimed the lives of at least 40 people since the signing of the agreement, according to a community record shared on 18 November in a meeting with chiefs in Pieri. With the rainy season that started in June, many of the Lou Nuer areas are inaccessible due to impassable road conditions and threat of Murle armed youth presence, thus, leaving some conflicts unresolved.

Sub-National and inter-communal conflict dynamics

Since early July 2022, internal tensions within the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction escalated into armed violence between forces aligned with its head, General Simon Gatwech, and his Deputy, General Johnson Olony (Agwelek forces). In July, fighting erupted between the Kitgwang forces and local armed opposition group (AOG) in Orash in the Wie-Panyikang area. On July 5, the Kitgwang forces reportedly attacked traders coming from South Kordofan to Tonga, killing one and injuring one. In response, the AOG forces launched an attack and eventually escalated tension in the area. Clashes continued throughout July and August, extending along the White Nile from Tonga to Atar. This incident has caused civilian displacement and triggered a humanitarian crisis, impacting Upper Nile State and neighbouring counties in Jonglei state and Ruweng Administrative Area.

In a latest report on 25 November, the Commissioner of Fashoda County in Upper Nile claimed that there is an alliance between the armed groups from Jonglei and Kitgwang to launch an attack in Fashoda. He also reported that in October, dozens of civilians

[2] For an overview of the age set dynamics and processes, see *Murle Heritage*, https://www.murleheritage.com/the-age-sets, last accessed 04 March 2023.

had been killed. Civilian displacement continued as another clash between Nuer armed groups and Shiluk community took place in Fashoda County on 1st December. Similarly, the Commissioner of Fangak County issued a statement in December that both Agwelek and Kitgwang forces were planning attacks on Fangak and Pigi counties and informed the Government of Jonglei State that Fangak and Pigi counties were prepared to defend themselves from violence. While the authenticity of the reports is yet to be verified, the public statement from the Fangak Commissioner highlights the ethnic undertones within the conflict.

During Phase 01, the dynamics outlined above have been an ongoing backdrop to the main conflict drivers of the ABP conflict system. There have been sporadic conflagrations within the ABP system when opposing forces of Kitgwang have clashed. More recently, the Gawaar under the leadership of Makuach have been heavily implicated in Upper Nile violence. At times, these preoccupations have in fact mitigated some of the internal and Murle-facing conflict drivers. Moving forward, these dynamics need to be monitored and mitigated, where necessary, but they do not present entry points at this stage for the ABP programming.

The incentives driving alliance processes between the Lou Nuer, Gawaar Nuer and Dinka Bor respectively remain fluid. Previous predictions of 'inevitable' pathways around mobilisation have not materialised precisely in the last year: the Nuer did not join the attempted mobilisation of the Dinka Bor in early 2022 and the December 2022 Lou Nuer-led mobilisation has not as yet led to the organised mobilisation of the Dinka Bor. Moreover, there remains a degree of internal division between the youth/community leadership of Bor South, and that of Twic and Duk. Moving forward, the ABP should avoid assumptions about the trajectory of alliances around violence and continue to assess all scenarios, then identifying the entry points to influence them towards peaceful mechanisms.

To address Gawaar Nuer and Lou Nuer conflict that started early in 2022, a peace conference was conducted in Pading Payam. Many traditional leaders, chiefs, youth, women, elders, civic leaders, county officials, nominee councillors, community associates, and local government officials attended the conference. Members of the SPLM-IG and IO, state ministers, state legislators (MPs), and representatives from humanitarian agencies were also invited. The conference ended with a peace agreement signed by both parties, but this has been unsuccessful in resolving the conflict.

Initiatives to address escalating mobilisation campaign late 2022

Sporadic attacks from GPAA remain exogenous to the extent that peacebuilding, development and humanitarian interventions (peace agreement resolutions and peace dividends) do not sufficiently reach armed youth and age-set groups on the margins. These groups have limited options for economic opportunities and livelihoods and therefore communal violence and political manipulation (cattle raiding, abduction of women and children and the resultant destruction of property, displacement of populations and loss of lives) remain a zero-sum game for them. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence supports a strong correlation between the prolonged inter-communal violence and capitulation of vulnerable armed youth groups to violence and political manipulation as a means of livelihoods in Jonglei and GPAA (between the Murle and Bor Dinka, Gawaar, Lou and Jikany Nuer in central-southern Jonglei and between the Murle and Anyuak, Jie, Kachipo and Toposa in Pochalla and Boma). While revenge attacks are prevalent among Gawaar and Lou Nuer armed youths, who equally have limited options to livelihoods, and have significant impact on intra-communal violence, they usually do not pose serious implications for inter-communal violence. But continued provocation by Murle usually leaves them vulnerable to mass mobilisation for the recovery their raided cattle and women and children abducted by GPAA youth.

Efforts made by ARG partners before the breakout of violence in December 2022 focussed on promoting the forbearance of communities in central-southern Jonglei and averting the mobilisation. That was successful in 2021, but in late 2022, community leaders cited delayed delivery of the promised peace dividends, aggravated further by the backdrop of continued provocations by GPAA attacks. Shuttle diplomacy in the last quarter of 2022 (Jonglei State authorities and ARG partners rapprochement mission to Pibor on 16 October and Jonglei and GPAA consultative peace dialogue meetings in Juba on 11 November 2022) yielded rapprochement between Bor south and GPAA authorities and tremendous progress was made toward resumption of peaceful coexistence. However, shuttle diplomacy by state authorities and peacebuilding actors on 6th to 11th December in Duk Padiet and Partet did not yield the desired results to avert mobilization in December 2022. Sporadic attacks by armed elements from GPAA continued even during the mobilisation attacks in Gumuruk, Lekuangole and Nanaam.

Phase I of RSRTF catalysed efforts to address the economic drivers of violence for youth in central-southern Jonglei (Uror, Akobo, Duk, Twic East and Bor South). But concerned armed youths from GPAA remained peripheral to these interventions due to access challenges. Following the community governance workshop of December 2021, ARG partners innovated around mobilizing the sons of "Red Chiefs" from Pibor and youth leaders from central-southern Jonglei to establish Peace Caravans in strategic locations in Gadiang, Nanaam, Wuno, Burmath and Pulbura, but that initiative was not well resourced. This is the missing piece for sustainable community violence reduction in Jonglei and GPAA. Phase II builds on the inroads made into these locations to catalyze delivery of peace dividends by targeting armed youth to disincentivise them from engaging in violence as a means of livelihoods.

Despite the escalation of violence and continued sporadic attacks, the majority of the programme participants from both sides remain committed to pursuing social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. For instance, on 24th December 2022 OXFAM field staff in Walgak reported that programme participants who benefited from RSRTF supported assets creation and members of Women and Youth Protection Teams did not support the mobilization and made efforts to dissuade the youth from mobilizing. Furthermore, the government and community leaders on both sides have made an appeal for urgent resumption of engagements to avert revenge attacks and the occurrence of another round of mobilisation in 2022.

The community governance structures at the local level (led by NP) and the inter-communal level (led by Peace Canal as a strategic partner, supported by ABP) provided a key focal point of respected community leadership throughout the engagement. Although the inter-communal governance structures faced challenges in implementation, the relationships established through that process form part of the landscape of entry points in the wake of the recent violence.

December 2022 violence

On 24-28 December 2022, youths from Uror, Akobo, Walgak, Nyirol, Ulang, Nasir, Twic East and Duk (Lou and Jikany Nuer and Bor Dinka) mobilized and attacked Lekuangole and Gumuruk Payams in Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). The attacks targeted three main locations; the first attack by Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka youth attacked Gumuruk and took over the town. The second attack by Lou Nuer youth from Uror targeted cattle camps and settlements in Nanaam, Kariak, Kongor and Lekuangole from 21-28 December. The third attack by Lou Nuer from Akobo and Walgak, and Jikany Nuer from Ulang targeted Lokormach and Malual in the first week of January 2023. While the youths who attacked Gumuruk have already returned to their homes, fighting was still being reported in Malual and the Nanaam corridor as of 8 January 2023. While Murle armed youths mobilized to defend their community, groups of armed Murle youth launched attacks in Motot and Wunbil in Nyirol county on 26 December. On 7-8 January, armed Murle groups attacked Duk Padiet in Duk county, Waat in Nyirol, and Walgak in Akobo.

According to initial reports, the attacks in Gumuruk led to the death of 22 Murle and 52 Lou Nuer and Bor Dinka, while the attacks in Lekuangole led to the death of 11 Murle and 130 Lou Nuer. One humanitarian, a security guard working for CRS, an implementing partner for WFP, was killed in Duk Padiet and an SSNPS officer was killed in Gumuruk and several SSPDF soldiers injured. However, the exact number of casualties remains unconfirmed.

At least 17,000 people were displaced in the GPAA and are receiving humanitarian aid in Pibor. Out an unconfirmed number of women and children who were abducted during the violence, 90 were transported back to Pibor and have been registered to receive support at "interim care centres".

Economic & Food Security

In 2021, a 100 United States dollar (USD) bill was equivalent to about 40,000 South Sudanese Pound (SSP) on the market within Juba. However, in the last quarter of 2022, the exchange rate for the same 100 USD bill went up to as high as 55,000 SSP and further as 70,000 SSP. This sharp currency depreciation was beyond the normal seasonal fluctuations and attributed to the knock-on effects of rising food and energy prices triggered by the Ukraine conflict, worsening economic hardships of the population, especially vulnerable groups (e.g., women and girls) and in hard-to-reach areas. The ongoing crisis and limited livelihood options have further exacerbated the exposure of women and girls to heightened protection and health risks, especially sexual and gender-based violence.

Heightened economic hardships and risks are also evident in GPAA. The delivery of food and other items to Pibor has become arduous due to the closure of Bor-Pibor road. Scarcity within Pibor market was further compounded by a reported electrical fire in September which saw multiple shops burnt down completely. Traders are taking a longer route from Juba to Kapoeta and Jebel Boma Road or hiring commercial flights, which have led to a significant price hike in GPAA. Moreover, since June, roads to Lekuangole, Verthet, and Gumuruk Counties have become increasingly inaccessible, and women have been forced to walk to get food from Pibor. As in the case for Lou Nuer areas, this has resulted in an increased number of criminal activities along the road including physical assaults, robberies, and killings. Moreover, in a report by Radio Tamazuj dated 24 November 2022, the Gumuruk County Commissioner in GPAA raised the alarm of a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Nanaam areas, Manyabol, and Lothila. This dire situation mirrors other counties in Jonglei and GPAA. Jonglei and GPAA remains the area of highest food insecurity in South Sudan with 78 percent of the population facing acute food insecurity. Compared to 2022 there has been a slight improvement in food security due a reduction of people facing famine-like conditions; however, extreme hunger prevails and is expected to worsen into the 2023 lean season.

Conclusion

While positive progress was made in Jonglei and GPAA during the RSRTF ABP phase I, inter- and intra-communal violence remains the primary threat to the stability gains achieved to date. Keeping Lou Nuer and Murle committed to the Pieri and subsequent

peace agreements, bringing Dinka Bor and Gawaar back to the process, and engaging armed youth in deep, isolated interiors will be crucial to promoting and sustaining negative peace in the sub-region.

2. PROBLEM ANALYSIS

What are the conflict trends and key conflict drivers in the target area, what is the impact on communities and how are different conflict drivers interrelated?

The key actors in the interrelated conflicts are armed youth leaders (in their community-specific structures), traditional and spiritual leaders who authorise the 'legitimate' use of violence, women influencers of the conflict, and state and national political and elite influencers. The objectives of the conflict have different dimensions. Economically, the protection of cattle herds in terms of health, food and water access, and physical security is paramount. The high cultural value Jonglei and GPAA communities attach to cattle renders livestock one of the leading drivers of intercommunal conflict. Most reported non-political clashes between neighbouring communities can be attributed to cattle in some form or another. The traditional practice of consolidating livestock in designated rural based 'cattle camps' for security and pasture has made the camps targets for raiders and breeding grounds for armed youth. The need to defend livestock from raiders/criminals remains the primary justification for keeping arms in camps. Customarily, not owning any livestock gives family a sense of shame and worthlessness. To these communities, anything that harms their cattle is an existential threat.

Violence has a social dimension by which armed youth leaders establish, protect and strengthen their status. Due to high customary bride price, youth seeking higher self-worth through marriage have generally found cattle raiding the most attractive and fastest option, despite the risks. It also links with the economic dimension as it supports wealth accumulation for key community actors. The abduction of women and children is also driven by economic and social objectives, but also provides the human resource need to return to home territories with raided cattle. From a transitional justice perspective, violence is often justified as revenge in ongoing cycles, in the absence of non-violent remedies and recourse.

Violence is at times inter-communal, intra-communal and political. The inter-communal dimension has a broad framing between Murle, on one hand, and Nuer and Bor Dinka on the other. However, the specifics of grievances and objectives vary across Jonglei and GPAA. The unifying justification factor for the Bor Dinka and the Nuer is the sporadic raiding – often violent and leading to fatalities in some cases – allegedly perpetrated by Murle armed youth who cross the borders from GPAA to Jonglei.

Core-periphery dynamics define the context as a whole. Communities are **marginalised** in the vertical state building exercise. Women are marginalised in decision-making and governance processes. Armed youth are marginalised from peaceful economic opportunities. Remote communities are marginalised in terms of availability of education and socio-economic opportunities and protection from human and food security threats. Substantial components of the dynamics outlined below flow as a response to this marginalisation with communities deploying the resources at their disposal to address their immediate needs (physical, psychological, identarian etc.).

In the **inter-communal dynamics**, the intersection of the ecology, economy and physical security system creates incentives for conflict in the short term and incentives for peace in the long term. Nuer and Dinka cattle herds need grazing lands away from seasonal (increasingly perennial) flooding in lower lands. This translates into violent responses to cattle being stolen, in the absence of any effective peaceful system of remedy and/or more generalised progress in establishing the rule of law. Ongoing violence or the perceived threat of violence impedes systematic cultivation, which drives food insecurity indicators. In turn, the food insecurity itself becomes a further driver of violence.

The **intra-communal dynamics** are context specific. The **Murle** are defined by a complex and distributed leadership system that intersects traditional chief structures of the so-called Red Chiefs lines with the age-set system of generational affiliation across GPAA. Intergenerational equity is a primary driver of the youngest (Kurenen) age-set's grievances, resistant to be deprived of their opportunity to accumulate wealth. This dynamic, when combined with violent conflict against the older Lango age-set, pushes Kurenen to the margins and exacerbates their inclination to prove themselves through inter-communal cattle raiding practices. The **Nuer** are beset with internal revenge killing issues that subsist throughout localized violence. There are also specific grievances between the **Lou** and **Gawaar** Nuer that remain fundamentally unresolved despite repeated attempts – these include both proximate triggers around cattle raiding and failure to pay compensation, but the deeper origins of the rift need to be investigated before further dialogues are attempted. The **Bor Dinka** internal issues are focused on a growing rift between the communities of Duk and Twic East, on the one hand, and Bor South, on the other hand. These relate to broader national political considerations, as well as internal Jonglei political competition over economic, natural, and other resources.

While the intra-communal issues are at present having as much, if not more of a negative impact than the ongoing alleged incursions from GPAA armed youth, in communities' perceptions according to MSS ethnographies, the inter-communal conflict issues are more serious, present, and consistent threats to their security and livelihoods.

Politically, there are direct and indirect dynamics. The most obvious direct relationship to higher level politics is the ongoing internal IO dispute between forces loyal to, variously, Riek Machar, Simon Gatwech and Johnson Olony. These dynamics are not determinative of the wider intra- and inter-communal dynamics, but they are persistent disrupters to any nascent stability emerging from the inter-communal peace process. There are periodic conflagrations in this conflict. The Phase II political engagement strategy (see below) will break down these incentive structures in more detail to understand the appropriate engagement mechanisms with different actors throughout phase 02. At this same time, this will need to ensure mitigating against the risk of capture by a subset of the political elite.

Describe how these issues have evolved during implementation of the 'Jonglei- GPAA' RSRTF area-based programme (Phase I).

There have been two key evolutions through ABP Phase I. The first relates to the role of the government. At the outset of Phase I, few official Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) appointments had been made, and certainly the systems of formal governance were ill-defined. Although the relevant authorities of Jonglei State and GPAA remain limited in their ability to exercise the key monitoring and accountability functions of the inter-communal process, they are showing increasing interest and ownership. Phase II will need to refine its political engagement strategy in response to this evolving dynamic, as far as possible by leveraging the positive intent of government (and supporting capacity building through the process). Simultaneously, mitigating risks of conflict insensitive interventions by government that could, whether inadvertently or deliberately, impact progress will be critical. While there are community complaints towards government actors, communities do nonetheless recognise their formal authority and legitimacy to a certain extent.

The likelihood of widespread violence ebbs and flows, partly with the seasonal cycle and as a function of confidence in the credibility of the peace process. At the outset of Phase I, in the immediate wake of the Pieri Agreement and the subsequent return of abductees, there was a strong sense of optimism. Sporadic attacks were an irritant, and the responses were less reactive. However, by early 2022, the sporadic attacks were continuing, there was political disengagement from the inter-communal governance structures (the formal state actors retreated somewhat from their earlier commitment to them). The sporadic attacks are explained on the GPAA side as a function of (a) economic drivers (including age set development/wealth accumulation); (b) insufficient logistical support for authorities and community leaders to reach the far-flung areas with explanations of the peace process; (c) failure of partners to follow through on promised resilience opportunities; (d) generally criminal mentalities. Whilst these offer partial explanations, further work is needed (see intervention strategy) on the relative weight of these factors and also underlying dynamics that may not have surfaced fully in the existing analysis.

A perception widened both that the GPAA communities were not bona fides and that there were no accompanying dividends that justified tolerance of the ongoing attacks. This created dynamics where ABP reconciliation programming was more reactive than systematic; stabilisation programming was unable to build continuity; and resilience programming continued but more in parallel to the other two pillars and with suspension of activities at times. The optimism following the Pieri conference is leading to an equal measure of scepticism in relation to the material benefits.

Analysis of December 2022 violence

The inter-communal negative peace has been tenuous for some time, with persistent sporadic attacks from GPAA into Jonglei on the one hand and threats of mobilisation from communities in central-southern Jonglei, on the other. The inter-communal (Nuer-Dinka-Murle) threat of violence has been mitigated at times by intra-community fracturing within the Nuer, Dinka, and Murle. At the same time, general volatility (at the intersection of inter- and intra-communal violence, IO-fracturing, youth leadership fracturing, climate-related displacement) has increased and led to persistent generalised instability. The combination of (a) community perceptions of inadequate delivery on peace dividends; (b) all government (vertically and horizontally) limited authority and ability to respond to violence; (c) donor resource limitations; (d) basic economic drivers – has meant that patience with the peace process on the Nuer and Dinka side has disintegrated, which has led to renewed mobilisations against the GPAA.

The return to violence on the one hand can be seen as a failure of the Pieri Agreement, but in another light, has served to reinforce the legitimacy of the Pieri Agreement: Lou Nuer *ostensibly* attacked *not* because Pieri failed, but because they characterised ongoing Murle attacks in central-southern Jonglei as violations of the Agreement justifying a retaliatory response. This is an important distinction and presents an opportunity to build on the Pieri process and gains, while addressing the gaps that the outbreak of violence has highlighted. These include:

- **Insufficient explicitly agreed details on responsibility and accountability.** Agreed accountability measures are minimal. There are no non-violent consequences for failure to implement even these accountability measures. Definitions of what accountability and for whom are also imprecise.
- **Under-delivery on community expectation of dividends.** The messaging on linkage between peace and dividends has been increasingly strong, but the tangible delivery of dividends weak. Community perception is that the dividends are not a sufficient disincentive to the use of violence to address ongoing sporadic violence.
- **Disruption of continuity in inter-communal in-person forums.** Progress and constructive engagement have been solid when in-person inter-communal meetings take place, but these have not happened for almost 12 months. Interim communication channels are not established systematically. The last 12 months have seen only ad hoc measures, reliant on proactive actors. Meanwhile, in the absence of direct exchanges, inflammatory narratives have more easily gained traction.

What has not changed is the need for all the proposed implementation measures in the RSRTF Phase 02 proposal. Functioning **Community governance structures** and their engagement with formal accountability and justice mechanisms are indispensable to any structural stabilisation. Further **abductions** have taken place, only reinforcing the centrality of this phenomenon to tactics of violence, as well as the fruits of peace. The engagement in the **border initiatives** remains the most reliable strategy for addressing the ongoing sporadic violence through the Nanaam and surrounding corridors. Ostensible justifications aside, pure economic factors are a considerable driver. Until progress can be made on **livelihoods, asset creation** and the foundations of a sustainable non-violent economy, there is no credible exit strategy from the cycles of violence.

Which conflict drivers or enablers did partners of the phase I Jonglei- GPAA' RSRTF area-based programme focus on influencing / addressing and is there evidence to suggest this was a successful approach?

The ABP Phase I implementation started on the back of the Pieri conference in March 2021. This provided an anchor point for the programme to situate interventions in response to explicit inter-communal agreement [Evaluation findings 3.1.b]. This translated into a broad emphasis on the reconciliation pillar on the inter-communal dynamics and how that process could be sustained and supported to become increasingly effective. This emphasised the role of the inter-communal governance structures as a forum for establishing community-led governance. Following the initial success with abductee returns, stresses on the inter-communal dynamics stalled momentum, and the abductee returns process made limited progress beyond the unprecedented success of the first stage. Meanwhile, work continued within communities on local structures and processes centred around protection. Regular reconciliation activities such as local protection teams were able to develop and strengthen local structures whereas rapid response at the inter-communal level mitigated attempts by spiritual leaders and some factions of armed youth leadership to re-activate comprehensive violence through mass mobilisation. This work was facilitated primarily through the Social Cohesion (Reconciliation) Sub-Group of the ARG, which also drew on the presence of non-RSRTF active field partners (POF-Peace Canal) and programmes (Shejeh Salam).

Stabilisation and resilience agendas were heavily impacted by the difficulty in integrating with reconciliation activities that were consistently unpredictable due to the context. The former pivoted towards the inter-communal governance structures as an entry point to establishing the Traditional Circuit Court envisaged by the Pieri Agreement. These began strongly, including the onboarding of government fully to the process. However, following the Baidit attack of December 2021, there was a deterioration of the enabling environment: slow progress in re-establishing the authorising environment post-Baidit; escalation of other primarily intra-communal issues that drew (limited) resources elsewhere; gaps in coordination. All these points will be addressed in different ways through the Phase 02 intervention strategy. They also invested considerable energy in exploring options for higher level accountability engagements, following consensus in the Social Cohesion Sub-Group that accountability efforts needed a stronger strategy. Resilience activities went forward, positively on their own terms but less integrated than envisaged because of the seasonal timelines they were beholden to such as crop production during the rainy season and community infrastructural development (e.g., access roads) during the dry season [cf Evaluation Findings 3.4.c]. Overall, the approach had at times unsatisfactory geographic and strategic coherence [Evaluation Findings 3.1.c, 3.2]

Nonetheless, although limitations to progress are evidenced in the ongoing sporadic raiding out of GPAA and the regular threats of mobilisation from Jonglei-based armed actors, there has been no large-scale violence since 2021. This would have been expected after the 2020 violence and can be considered at least partly attributable to the ABP [Evaluation Findings 3.5, noting caveat that cyclical violence is not always immediate].

What key conflict drivers or enablers will the phase II interventions target and why are these selected as priority issues?

Communities were aware even at the time of the Pieri Agreement that much of the initial stability of the process would rely on the ability of communities in the GPAA border areas to address youth incentives for violence. Failure to make substantial progress on this presents Phase II with its central problem:

- how to intervene in inter-communal border areas [inter-communal conflict drivers, geographical core-periphery drivers], with the right actors, in a timely manner?
- How to do this in a way that restructures incentives [economic core-periphery drivers] for those who initiate and participate in violence and authorise the use of violence?
- How to preserve sufficient internal peace on all sides [intra-communal drivers] such that opportunities for resilience programming can be fully leveraged [economic and social core-periphery drivers].

In December 2021, the communities themselves had endorsed the focus on the border areas of Nanaam, but follow-up met with a series of challenges (internally within RSRTF partners and externally in the context) preventing sufficient progress in implementation. Moving into Phase II, the focus will bridge the divide between core and periphery of the conflict system, with the overriding objective of violence reduction [Evaluation Findings 3.3.b]. In order to stabilise the core progressively, Phase II will prioritise the inter-communal governance structures (and any ancillary structures that emerge) as the forum for consistent, regular inter-communal engagement among key core community actors. This will also support the sustainability of governance progress [Evaluation Findings 3.6.b].

At the periphery, material support and geographic presence will focus in the border areas (Anyidi-Manyabol, Kadiang, Pulbura-Weikol, Bishbish, Wuno, Burmath) [Evaluation Recommendations pt. 3 – the key Nanaam areas of engagement were also identified at the December 2021 meeting of the Inter-communal Governance Structures in Pibor], engaging youth responsible for violence and women particularly [Evaluation Findings pt. 4] who are strategic change agents for sustainable non-violent communities. Phase I has categorically underlined both the overwhelming desire for peace in communities, and the equally overwhelming reality that this will not eventuate in the absence of substantive, salient dividends that the communities *perceive* as a dividend of the peace process [Evaluation Recommendations pt. 2].

Throughout, recognising the greater presence of formal State authority, and the importance of supporting effective intent of Government to maintain peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution, there will be greater emphasis on a coherent and proactive political engagement strategy (see below) [Evaluation Findings 3.6.i].

In your answers above, please incorporate detailed, current, and disaggregated data related to the challenges identified, to be supplemented with references to identified baselines and relevant recent assessments, and/or research reports and recommendations. Please cite findings from the independent evaluation, and data collected through the 'Measuring Safety and Security' methodology in discussing safety and security challenges in the area.

3. GENDER ANALYSIS & GENDER MAINSTREAMING

In relation to the problems identified, provide detail on the specific vulnerabilities of women and men, girls and boys, and how these have evolved during phase I of this programme (if applicable). Explain how the proposed action is designed to address gender-based inequalities and meet the needs of different population groups.

Structural gender inequality persists notably due to deep-rooted legal and societal factors. Women are particularly disadvantaged and face unique risks, which are compounded by other factors, such as displacement or heading a household. Almost 80 per cent of displaced households are female headed. Gender-based violence (GBV) exacerbated by conflict, culture of violence rooted into beliefs, and other triggers, remains a main protection concern across South Sudan including in conflict hotspots that the ABP is targeting. The underlying assumption appears to be that women are untrustworthy, such stereotypical attitudes and reasoning are a discriminatory barrier and a burden on victims of sexual violence.

Lack of awareness and inadequate response and lack of psycho-social support mechanisms and other protection and medical facilities mean that many victims do not seek protection or redress (Amnesty International, 2017). Both within the family and the wider society, sexual violence is met with silence and stigma. The underlying root causes of gender-based violence are the longer-term context of gender dynamics and unequal power relations between men and women within South Sudanese society, which have been aggravated by the civil wars and the endemic levels of violence during these conflicts (Amnesty International, 2017: 18; Republic of South Sudan Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, 2014: 10, 11).

GBV, including rape as a weapon of war, abduction, forced sexual favours, and general violence against women was widespread during the civil wars and remains a serious health and development challenge in post-war South Sudan (Republic of South Sudan Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, 2014). Domestic violence is widespread in South Sudan, with common forms including physical and verbal abuse, sexual violence, early and forced marriage, and economic deprivation (Human Rights Watch, 2013:44). The increased risk of GBV and gaps in response services, coupled with shrinking humanitarian funding, highlight an urgent need for GBV prevention, risk mitigation, and scaling up of specialized GBV response services. Specifically, there is a need to strengthen GBV case management, health response to GBV survivors, psychosocial support, safety and security, legal service, safe houses, livelihood, economic support, and GBV referral pathways. Primary GBV prevention interventions such as Engaging Men and Boys through Accountable Practices, and the Community Care programme, integration of GBV actions into other

sectoral responses including safety audits, strengthening of GBV coordination, and provision of dignity kits are high priority interventions for the GBV Area of Responsibility (AoR). AOR is the coordinating platform for all GBV interventions at the national and state levels to ensure standardization and quality of interventions; NP and GREDO participate in the GBV sub-clusters, ensuring integration with these mechanisms.

As a result of the inclusive community-based and led approaches to be applied in programmatic approach, all beneficiary engagements on peacebuilding, strengthening social cohesion and co-existence as well as creating a safe and protective environment for conflict-affected persons, gender-based inequalities will be addressed. Platforms for discussions on gender disparities will be included in the narratives and joint advocacy initiatives executed across the RSRTF pillars at the national and State levels. For instance, collaboration with government entities, 'demand for social service work force in the gender line ministries and departments, and capacity-building to ensure quality, commitment, and sustainability of outcomes.

Women, men and youth, will also participate equitably in discussions with relevant government stakeholders and state authorities regarding their protection needs (e.g., forced recruitment concerns), and their role in decision-making in their communities.

If applicable, highlight any learning from phase I and how this has informed a revised approach during phase II to how gender considerations are integrated into programme design, and mainstreamed through programme management, delivery, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning.

Reports from Phase I of the project, showed that more women were affected by conflict-related abduction than men who took part in active conflict. Women are taken by cattle raiders after and during conflict to replace lost relatives to the affected parties; therefore, the abduction of women serves as a means of revenge or conflict weapon. During peace negotiations, it was agreed by the communities that upon release, women would be allowed to leave with their children born while in captivity; however, in some instances, abductors asked women to leave the children behind, and this led to failed, delayed release as well as re-abduction.

In Phase II, GBV, among other gender equity issues, will be incorporated into interventions such as working through local peace structures and institutions, abduction prevention and response, support to informal justice mechanisms, creating increased space for civic participation of women and youth, stabilization through strengthening capacity for local and national governance structures. Community engagement, including peace dialogues and negotiations, will ensure that women participate in negotiating for their children and fulfil their role of parenting for durable and comprehensive reintegration and prevention of abduction among other conflict-affected vices. Interventions will focus on scaling up the Communities Care Programme for Gender Based Violence prevention and social norms transformation. The ABP will also continue to scale up the provision of GBV prevention and response services in targeted areas. The activities will aim to improve women's and girls' self-sufficiency and self-confidence by empowering them with relevant skills and knowledge to enhance their economic and socio-cultural standing through referrals, service delivery and advocacy initiatives.

All community awareness messaging will have GBV prevention messages incorporated along with child protection and peace building. The community will be consulted in the formulation of appropriate and context-specific messages. Messages will be conveyed via various means that will leverage existing and emerging community structures and communication channels and will aim at reshaping gender norms, especially towards positive image of women and role in society including peace building.

All Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (MEL) processes and narratives in the project will deliberately design and align tools with standard, clear gender segregation, including articulation of the differences/details of figures and issues affecting women and how they are addressed within the life of the project and through complementary project interventions in the same locations. The gender approach in Phase II will therefore involve describing the needs of women, men and children in relation to sexual violence, GBV and reproductive health, also using some secondary data from previous phase reports, evaluation and from the ISNA data.

4. YOUTH INCLUSION AND MAINSTREAMING

Provide a youth-sensitive conflict analysis, describing the specific role of youth in relation to the problems identified. Outline how the proposed interventions incorporate youth perspectives and foster youth inclusivity in addressing drivers of conflict that incentivize violence. Describe how the programme design, implementation, and monitoring, evaluation, and learning will be youth responsive.

Although they positively contribute to society in many ways, youth are also primary perpetrators of violence and spoilers of peace in Jonglei and GPAA. They are involved in criminal activities including but not limited to robberies on the road, physical and sexual assaults, abduction, compound intrusions, and killings. Most violations to the Pieri resolutions have been committed by youth on all sides. In community engagements during ABP Phase I, chiefs, local authorities and women consistently pointed out the

importance of engaging the youth. Thus, the consortium partners will support youth's capacity in life and leadership skills and livelihoods and strengthen engagement with youth as partners throughout ABP Phase II.

Understanding who are the youth within the programme context does not follow international definitions of the term (I.e., people aged 18-35). One of the findings and lessons from Phase I of the ABP is that there are important distinctions among youth (I.e., town or intellectual youth vs rural youth), and self-definitions of youth, with self-defined youth often falling outside the international youth definition. Based on cultural norms, during Phase I partners learned how essential it is that 'older' 'youth' are engaged in order to reach the 'younger' 'youth'. Moving into Phase II of the ABP, efforts will be made to engage definitional youth while also looking more closely at interests/needs of self-defined youth, rather than just age ranges.

Age-set Groups within Murle Community

At the present, Lango and Kurenen groups are the most active age-sets in terms of violent conflict across three counties in GPAA: Gumuruk, Lekuangole and Pibor. Guzuli or Thubezwa, a newly established age-set group which defected from Kurenen of Lekuangole in early 2021, has not yet gained recognition, although several violent encounters with Kurenen have been reported within 2022.

Defection from one age-set group to the other is known to be the primary cause that triggers violent conflict. Traditionally, once a member leaves his age-set and joins another one, members of the original age-set will approach his family and try to win him back. Parents will be required to slaughter a bull and feed the age-set members. Nowadays, this practice is not always followed, and most defections lead to violent interaction and sometime killing.

Getting a wife (booking system) is another cause of violent conflict between and among age-set groups. In the Murle culture and with the age-set system, for a young man to get a wife, he has to approach the family of the girl he likes and express his intention. Once an agreement is made, dowry will start until the girl will be ready enough to be taken by her husband. During this time, no ceremony is conducted, or the agreement is legally binding; therefore, it is possible that another man starts courting the girl even if she is engaged. Such instances always lead to age-set fighting and unfortunately, beating of the girl or even her mother and father. There are also several cases of men engaging married women that result in violent conflict between age-set groups as well as between sub-groups within one age-set.

Marginalization between different age-sets and within sub-groups of one age-set is another trigger of violent conflict. Within age-sets, there is a hierarchy, and younger members are mostly the minority in the age-set. For example, during age-set gathering, younger members are the ones to serve elder members, and the formers' opinions are not given importance in meetings. They are not allowed to speak or take part of decision making. This practice leads to division within the age-set and sooner or later, alienation or defection from the group.

These are among factors that triggers age-set violence within GPAA. Whenever violent conflict arises between two groups, one will always be chased away from town and isolated in the bush, especially in Gumuruk and Lekuangole counties. During a mission to Wuno conducted by social cohesion actors, it revealed that age-sets staying along Nanaam areas are in one way or the other involved in age-set violence. This then can be linked to armed youth who conduct sporadic attacks to GPAA neighbouring communities.

Locations of age-set groups and their composition:

I. Wuno – Dominated by 4 different subgroups of Kurenen
II. Kariak – Dominated by Lango
III. Kotome – Mixed Lango and Kurenen
IV. Bichbich – Mixed Lango and Kurenen
V. Manyabol – Mixed Lango and Kurenen
VI. Gumuruk – Mixed Lango and Kurenen (with Kurenen having larger number)
VII. Lekuangole – Mixed Lango, Kurenen, and Guzuli (with Kurenen having larger number)
VIII. Pibor – Mixed Lango and Kurenen (with Lango having larger number)

White Army

The White Army in Lou Nuer areas plays a crucial role in protecting their communities. When there are rumoured threats from the Murle, they are mobilized to conduct patrol along border areas. When there is a cattle raid or abduction, they are expected

to follow and retrieve what and who is taken from their community. In other words, their social responsibility is that of community protection and defence. However, several factors can influence these armed youths to be aggressive towards other communities including cattle raiding.

In a community meeting in Nyirol in November 2022 where youth mobilization was partly discussed, one local authority vocally expressed his disappointment towards the White Army for being reluctant to protect their community, especially from sporadic attacks to Lou Nuer areas. He then encouraged the youth to be brave enough. This kind of social expectation, coupled with peer pressure among their group and the desire to stay in leadership, usually lead to violent acts.

Cattle-Raiding

Cattle are the most common driver of violence between and among youth from Jonglei and GPAA. They desire to have cattle for marriage or to pay compensations, and to gain social status/recognition. This is also the reason why White Army youth from Ulang and Jikany from Nasir Counties in Upper Nile, usually join mass mobilization so they can bring home cattle. For a Lou Nuer armed youth leader to stay in a leadership position, members pressure him to lead a mobilization to raid cattle. This can be countered strategically through Phase II, instead of a mobilizing to raid cattle, the armed youth leaders can mobilize for the border initiatives, the Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) component and other peace dividends. Instead of raiding cattle, the youth will be engaged in resilience building activities and receive material support (e.g., food and tools) for their families.

Conclusion

In ABP Phase I, peace partners started engaging the youth and established a strong relationship. The learning from Phase I including recommendations from youth will inform the design of Phase II. The foundation built by peace partners through different activities with the youth is essential for the implementation of Phase II.

One of the main challenges and causes of the delays in Phase I was the seasonal change from the dry season to rainy season. This has greatly affected the implementation of the programme due to accessibility issues. In Phase II, youth, especially in the border areas, will need to be strategically engaged during the dry season and as the season changes. Focus of intervention will vary while continuously monitoring interventions during the dry season. This will include the deployment of community protection teams in different areas.

5. THEORY OF CHANGE

Present the core theory that explains why the proposed approach will deliver the intended result and the basis for this belief.

"We believe that by doing X (action) it will achieve Y (progress) because Z (rationale)". The theory of change should demonstrate a clear orientation of the planned programme around the central objective of violence reduction.

Explain assumptions for why the interventions will achieve the required change in the specific context at this time. Are assumptions based on evidence from past programmes, e.g., from the partners' first phase of programming in Jonglei- GPAA? Or are they based on research, or the experience of the stakeholders and beneficiaries consulted during programme design?

During the Phase II co-design process, the consortium partners, informed by the Phase I evaluation, Pieri resolutions and the RSRTF Secretariat's guidance, agreed that the core problem in Jonglei and GPAA was inter- and intra-communal violence and that the ABP would focus on key strategic interventions to reduce it. Thus, a unified theory of change posits that an integrated area-based nexus programme can help break inter-generational cycle of violence by implementing activities that support reconciliation, stabilization and resilience of communities where other initiatives have not reached, and populations, especially youth and women, resort to violence, or are affected by its effects, thereby pushing back overall peace building in Jonglei and GPAA. To develop the new theory of change, all interventions were evaluated according to four criteria: 1) Relevance (incl. causal relation to violence reduction and linkage to Pieri peace process); 2) Coherence (including integration and geographic scope); 3) Effectiveness (including partner adaptability and strategic coordination); and 4) Efficiency (including operational considerations and funding arrangements).

Under the **reconciliation pillar**, key interventions include support to local peace structures, institutions and peace processes, peace messaging and awareness raising, abduction prevention and response, and rapid response to avert mobilization and the escalation of violence. These interventions will target youth, armed youth, chiefs, women, state and local government structures, leaders including religious and spiritual leaders, youth who abduct, Women Protection Teams (WPT), and Youth Protection Teams (YPTs). **If** ABP reconciliation interventions are implemented, **then** chiefs, state and local government structures, leaders including religious and spiritual leaders, and community-led mechanisms such as WPTs and YPTs will have the **capacity** to prevent and respond to communal violence, engage in peace processes, and reconcile differences, misunderstandings and unresolved conflicts. These interventions will also contribute to **behavioural changes including** local governance structures to strengthen

ownership of the peace process by use of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms; willingness, and acceptance to support the tracing and re-integration of abductees; and local peace structures resort to peaceful means in community violence by using non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms.

Under the **stabilization pillar,** key interventions include support to formal justice and law enforcement institutions and informal justice mechanisms, and community-based security as well as capacity strengthening of community governance structures and women and youth for increased civic participation. These interventions will target actors in the formal justice chain that exists in targeted areas, inter-community governance structures, and informal justice mechanisms in project locations. **If** ABP stabilization interventions are implemented, **then** formal and informal justice actors will have the capacity to participate in ongoing rule of law interventions, engage and participate in decision making platforms, and provide increased access to justice for the population using established frameworks and mechanisms. Increased capacity of formal and informal justice actors will contribute to **behavioural changes** such as increased implementation of judiciary services, accountability, respect for the limited mandate and jurisdiction of customary courts(in particular the limitation on adjudication of criminal cases); enhanced professionalism and mutual respect; increased coordination and communication on peace processes between formal and informal mechanisms, and between community representatives within mechanisms; existing informal and formal mechanisms and systems used to report and adjudicate intercommunal violence cases; and reduced carrying and visibility of guns.

Under the **resilience pillar,** key interventions include community assets creation, especially access roads, in conflict hotspots, livelihood support, including alternative livelihoods for armed youth and women in conflict hotspots, informal learning opportunities for armed youth and cattle camp populations, and local capacity for resource management. These resilience interventions will primarily target armed youth, women, population in cattle camps, and will be informed by the reconciliation and stabilization pillars. **If** resilience interventions are implemented, **then** communities will increase access to and utilization of community assets, thereby reducing physical marginalization; armed youth and women will have the capacity to engage in positive livelihood activities; they will effectively utilise acquired skills and knowledge; and their capacity in natural resource management will be enhanced. Increased capacity of target groups will contribute to **behavioural changes** such as increased productive capacity, increased agency and self-reliance, increased youth and women engagement in peace promotion, functional resource management structures, and increased peace dividends.

The reconciliation, stabilization and resilience interventions will be co-located, layered, sequenced and integrated to the greatest extent so that they contribute to capacity and behavioural changes which will result in the resolution of communal conflict. The ABP will promote the use of non-violent means for conflict resolutions, trust between populations and communities in informal and formal mechanisms in targeted areas, participation of marginalized groups, and strengthened socio-economic resilience of targeted populations. These will collectively contribute to reduction of inter- and intra-communal violence in targeted areas, contributing to improved safety and security in Jonglei and GPAA.

The programme theory of change is underpinned by the following assumptions (which were identified during the co-design workshop):

- The right participants and groups are targeted for interventions and activities.
- The political scenario and targeted people in targeted areas allow the implementation of programme interventions.
- Partners can access targeted areas via different means of transport, including during the rainy season.
- Partners have full capacity to implement the planned activities in the targeted areas.
- Targeted communities' engagement is genuine and effective.
- Targeted actors have the relevant authority within their communities.
- Targeted populations are willing and or incentivised to change capacities and behaviour.
- Lower levels of violence continue but does not impede project implementation.

If the following risks occur, they will negatively impact on the programme implementation and achievement of desired change:

- There is a complete breakdown of peace in targeted areas.
- RSRTF partners and government approaches are misaligned.
- Interventions benefit one side of the conflict more than others, which they use to gain an advantage to perpetuate violence.
- Targeted populations use the capacities gained from this programme to act against the programme objectives.

Underpinning this programme is a comprehensive theory of change of the ABP Phase II (Annex 5).

6. INTERVENTION STRATEGY:
Referring to the RSRTF Outcomes, for each of the relevant areas below, describe the type of interventions envisaged, state why they are required and what change is anticipated as a result of the actions. Explain how the Phase I end-of-programme evaluation and conflict sensitivity considerations have informed the design of the intervention strategy in Phase II. *Proposed interventions should have a clear causal relationship to influencing the most important determinants of the conflict/problem.* *If the overall intervention includes critical no-cost contributions from strategic partnerships also indicate the expected role/contribution of these elements to the comprehensive approach. For example, strategic cooperation with UNMISS in terms of good offices, policing, patrolling etc. It is essential that these strategic partnerships are discussed and agreed with the relevant counterparts prior to inclusion in the proposal to ensure that these engagements can be undertaken and determine if associated budget allocations are required.*

Overview

The Phase 01 intervention strategy has been reviewed in detail through the ABP independent evaluation, and further interrogated in the wake of the December 2022 violence.

The tendency in moments of conflagration is to look for a binary analysis: does the violence mean that Phase I failed?

From the ARG perspective, the violence is a significant setback, and more importantly has increased the trauma on affected population. At the same time, the series of nine strategic review conversations that have taken place among 15 different partners and strategic partners in the area since the outbreak of violence bring a more optimistic picture. The ABP finds itself overall in a more promising landscape than was the case after the 2020 violence: the scope of ground level entry points available to the partners immediately following the violence; legitimacy of action on all sides was justified with reference to the Pieri Agreement, which indicates that strengthening of the clarity and detail of the agreement has prospects of impact; there are strong collaborative relationship amongst most key partners with respect to : information sharing / communication generally / activity coordination / strategy; there is an increasingly strong opportunity to prevent a further retaliation.

The process of strategic review within the ARG has delineated three buckets of strategic elements and activities: (i) those that were ineffectual; (ii) those that were effectual in themselves but not reinforced sufficiently with complementary activities to have wider impact; (iii) those that were missing in the Phase 01 design.

The elaboration of the intervention strategy below outlines the key points emerging from this review, revised Strategic Directions and their intended results, and key intervention areas and activities. With this framework, the ABP is confident that it can begin Phase 02 on an effective foundation.

Phase 01 challenges and proposed phase 02 response

Phase 01 Challenge	Phase 02 Proposed pivot
Programming	
Geographic targeting diffuse across wider Jonglei/GPAA and alignment between pillar target areas not always in place.	**Refocus around inter-communal border areas** between GPAA and Jonglei (Anyidi-Manyabol, Kadiang, Pulbura-Weikol, Bishbish, Wuno, Burmath). This will also strengthen the core-periphery imbalance in geographic and socio-economic terms.
Stabilisation programming focussed on the inter-communal dynamics and piecemeal interventions according to what the authorising environment enabled; due to the challenges in the overall inter-communal framework, a fully integrated and systematic approach was not possible.	**More targeted and informed interventions aimed at building capacities of formal/informal justice actors** and strengthen their linkages to prevent and peacefully resolve intra-communal violence and establish inter-communal accountability mechanisms. Integration of accountability programming more comprehensively into the strategy for the two other pillars. Recent violence increases complexity of the grievances to be comprehensively analysed and addressed. This requires further understanding of the political economy and incentive structure of the sporadic Murle 'provocations'. Further research on the historical and current social, political, and socio-economic role of abductions of women and children as part of the inter-communal conflict in Jonglei and GPAA with a focus on potential prevention and rapid response mechanisms is required. The centrality of accountability is unchanged. General community engagement required to assess appetite/acceptance of accountability measures building on research conducted during Phase 1. Abductees returns to prominence, but the approach should be stepwise and not assume this will be the first entry point to accountability measures.
Reconciliation programming focussed on support to ongoing Pieri process and response to incidents arising. The key levers to preserve stability in response to violence were not consolidated, in	**More resources will be invested into structured, systematic inter-communal governance structures as the architecture serving all three pillars.** Greater emphasis on the preparation leading towards meetings, so that foundations of agreement are already in place before the time-limited direct engagement. This

particular the inter-communal governance structures, and generally the channels of exchange between communities. The duration of inter-communal engagements (including three-way translation) was often insufficient to reach sufficient detail.	will allow those to focus on the consolidation of ways forward, rather than detailed formative discussion. The recent violence also underlines the imperative to clarify mutual roles and responsibilities, to mitigate divergent interpretations of the Pieri Agreement. Initial work will focus on community re-engagement and progressive detailing of a Community Partnership Agreement that explicitly lays out respective obligations and consequences for failure to fulfil them.
Resilience programming, partly due to workplan constraints and early-stage coordination issues, proceeded but was in many cases either (a) not linked with other pillar activities; or (b) not perceived as linked by the communities. This reduced the effectiveness of HDP messaging with communities.	**Targeting decisions refocussed around key youth actors responsible for violence, and women.** Decision-making on targeting to be integrated with common structures for intra- and inter- communal agreement. Agreements around resilience provision need to be integrated into Community Partnership Agreement. Substantively, the recent mobilisation does not change the resilience strategy, as resilience programming was always to be a function of initial engagements by other pillars.
Incentive structuring was based heavily on in principle promises that peace would bring material dividends to affected communities that would obviate the rationale for . raids. No accountability measures were in place for external actors. No consequences, nor mechanisms for creating consequences for breaches of the agreement were available to actors other than the armed youth.	The design draws together the sequencing element to ensure that a **clear logic flows from community agreement to implementation of agreed measures** by resilience partners (without unreasonable delays – 'unreasonable' defined by the community). The gap in 'consequences' would be addressed through the inter-communal governance structures. Based on initial post-violence assessments, the provocative attacks out of GPAA need to be weighted more strongly in the assessment of the communities' utility function. Sufficient detail needs to be brought to the Community Partnership Agreement such that they reflect not reality of incentive structures, not aspiration (i.e. not based on a notional commitment to peace, but on measures that substantively will give rise to a practical commitment to peace).
Operations	
Resourcing and response mechanisms were distributed across multiple budgets, with limited central accountability and few concrete tools for informal coordination agreements to be implemented swiftly.	**Coordination integrated under one consortium,** including again strategic partners who wish to engage (e.g. World Bank, DRC, UNICEF, CEPO, Oxfam). Rapid response mechanisms budgeted and housed with agencies able to minimise time between agreement to implementation
Budget inflexibility within individual agency systems / available budget unable to be released in a timely manner to address necessary responses.	**Improving accessibility through crisis modifier budget and transport budget,** situating the budget line with agencies who have the more responsive administrative capability. Avoiding individual activity budgets split across multiple agencies.
Coordination	
Gaps in critical information sharing and harmonisation of activities, partly due to reluctance and partly the complicated structure of the Phase 01 project.	Revising the day-to-day coordination system and establishing **whole-of-consortium quarterly review and learning meetings.** Movement to one consortium improves visibility over the portfolio of activities.
Harmonisation of field-level and program-level ARG not fully complete and some decisions not cascaded downwards/upwards, as relevant.	Shift to one consortium and consolidation of processes, including through an explicit shared understanding on coordination expectations.

Requirement for coordination not formalised and consequences for non-coordination largely reliant on peer accountability.	Specific ABP activity on coordination and establishment of **mutual accountability agreement.** Pillar activities only to proceed to implementation with agreement of the relevant pillar, cross-checking with other pillars as appropriate, to ensure program coherence.
Exogenous challenges	
Flooding and climate related effects on community settlements and livelihood options.	This is a critical concern, and is an underlying driver of the program design itself. Securitisation and stability of the border areas can afford wider options for communities who have been forced into more permanent settlement of areas particularly prone to flooding. Access to areas affected by flooding will continue to be supplemented by wider access work of humanitarian partners, including WFP and UNMISS.

Strategic Directions

The ARG and relevant sub-groups have had nine meetings since the outbreak of violence in December, to assess the lessons and entry points moving forward. Based on the lessons from Phase 01 and the re-assessment since the December 2022 violence (which is ongoing in dialogue with communities), the strategic directions for Phase 02 are as follows:

1) **Deepening understanding of the localised cultural and economic landscape.** It was agreed the design of Phase 02 has the correct focus on the border areas. More broadly, however, there are gaps in understanding of the specific political economy of the ongoing sporadic attacks by the perpetrators from the Murle community, including the incentive structures around these 'provocations'. There is an understanding of the role played by: age set establishment and wealth accumulation; general resource accumulation in absence of other economic opportunities; perception of legitimacy after 2020 attacks; and historical patterns of competition. Equally, there are gaps. The narrative that there is a complete disjuncture between the will of the community as a whole for peace and the deviant activities of 'unreachable' youth in the bush is not fully credible. This needs further interrogation to understand what the economic and cultural pull factors on all sides will be, but especially the GPAA, that can end the sporadic violence. The programmatic objective needs to shift from minimising sporadic violence to eliminating it.
2) **Community engagement towards integration of concrete accountability measures in the Pieri Process.** There is consensus that the process of accountability was already complicated and now has further layers of complexity to it in the wake of the violence. It needs a stepwise approach and there is no silver bullet intervention. Engagements need to be auspiced by State and local level authorities, and at the same time the social contract around accountability measures will rely ultimately on acceptance from the communities – this was demonstrated in the course of the mobilisation, where direct interventions on the basis of formal authority from the State and National leadership (up to and including the first Vice President) were directly rejected by the youth leaders. Short of the national government agreeing to establish a degree of martial law as a temporary circuit breaker and/or reflexive disarmament effort (which has never worked to date in South Sudan), the approach needs to remain grounded in an iterative State-community process – this is as much about a shift of mindset as it is to immediately implement concrete justice measures. The coordination on accountability strategy should pivot away from 'pillars' (stabilisation versus reconciliation) to integrate the work of protection partners with the efforts of accountability partners, specifically to identify next steps including accountability through criminal and formal justice mechanisms. There are two layers to the accountability question:
    a) **Accountability for any specific agreement as part of renewed dialogue** [Reconciliation-led]– this will entail the progressive detailing of specific, measurable responsibilities of Authorities, Community, and Aid Actors respectively, and the consequences for a given stakeholder if they fail to fulfil their obligations.
    b) **Criminal and civil justice** [Stabilisation-led] – progressive detailing of criminal and civil systems, including credible implementations, to address individual and communal grievances.
3) **Leveraging ongoing women's focused activities.** Through a number of partners, there has been increasing emphasis on the role of women in addressing drivers. At times, there has been very practical support for peace, with women having a particularly strong role in putting down mobilisation attempts in early 2022. Subsequently, the outputs of these engagements have been more rhetorical than practical, and limited resourcing has been given to the consistent requests for exchange channels between women across the communities. It provides another focal point for strengthened coordination (lessons to date, approach moving forward) across the different partners who are engaging on women-specific activities.

4) **Improving external communications and integrated messaging.** There have been moments of highly effective joint (HDP-nexus) messaging and engagement, including the Northern Jonglei joint humanitarian-peace partner mission in early 2022 and the inter-agency mission to Wuno that followed; feedback from communities and through partners indicated that these messages had been absorbed. However, the follow-up has been lacking and the consistency of the private external (e.g. with government) and public communications strategy needs to be addressed. This relies not just on coordination, but in translating consensus points into explicit communications that are reinforced and not undermined by partners. This becomes especially important in the current environment, where emergency assistance on the basis of humanitarian principles must continue, at the same time as we are working to build a message that violence has consequences. Possibilities, for example around linkages between upcoming food distributions and community engagement, will be explored.
5) **Strengthening internal coordination within and beyond the ARG.** There was concern that already there are parallel approaches emerging, with some partners arriving at their own conclusions without consultation and pushing those initiatives forward unilaterally. Fundamentally, different approaches can be discussed and integrated, but if the principle of collective strategizing and decision-making is abandoned, it will likely undermine all partners' effectiveness. This was a strong finding of the RSRTF evaluation. The new engagement of strategic partners like DRC and World Bank continues the more positive trajectory of coordination around key strategic tracks (coordination is not about coordinating everything).

Intended results

Strategic Direction 01 (*Deepening understanding of the localised cultural and economic landscape*): granular understanding – differentiated by geography – of economic, social and cultural landscape and the relative drivers towards violence or peace, enabling clearer understanding of where programming is supporting, hindering, or where there are gaps.

Strategic Direction 02 (*Community engagement towards integration of concrete accountability measures in the Pieri Process*): A Community Partnership Agreement, with supporting inter-communal governance structures that are meeting regularly, with continuity of participation, and are demonstrating ability to (a) make decisions relevant to community and (b) oversee implementation of those decisions. Nascent measures in place for community-led initiatives to fund the ongoing work of the community structures.

Strategic Direction 03 (*Leveraging ongoing women's focussed activities*): Active women's representative bodies engaging in regular inter-communal exchanges (socially and economically), as well as regular internal exchanges with youth and other leadership as advocates of peace and security.

Strategic Direction 04 (*Improving external communications, feedback loops, and integrated messaging*): A working communications strategy, with regular strategic communications with key stakeholders, including but not limited to state and local level authorities; cascading communications to the community and feedback loops to gauge community perceptions and directions (independently of governance structure mechanisms, for triangulation).

Strategic Direction 05 (*Strengthening internal coordination within and beyond the ARG*): A functional RSRTF coordination system that avoids duplication, is able to demonstrate decision-making based on the combination of feedback from the community, and internal review and learning, as well as clear documentation of adaptations and pivots; a system of information sharing externally with partners who are not directly engaging through the ARG, ensuring that RSRTF ongoing learning is made available widely.

Interventions

The outline of interventions below flows from the Strategic Directions above. Most interventions incorporate elements that contribute to all five Strategic Directions. These interventions are grouped under pillars, according to the pillar that will be responsible for their coordinating. A lesson from Phase 01 has been that the most effective work happens when the program integrates all pillars into the activities under each. Hence, under most activities – in particular reconciliation led activities that are foundational to subsequent stabilisation and resilience programming – there are agencies involved from other pillars.

It is important to note that these activities are based on the current assessment. Through the quarterly review framework, the suitability of the activities will be assessed on an ongoing basis and, where necessary, any adjustments will be made. Where these require approval of the Secretariat, the ABP Coordinator will lead that process. It is important to recognise that in the complex dynamics of programming in Jonglei, many of the risks (and opportunities) will only emerge as the program moves forward, and cannot be predicted in advance. What is therefore central to RSRTF partners' strategy here is a system that will make visible these risks and opportunities in a timely manner, with an equally timely mechanism to adapt responsively. This is about shifting emphasis to real-time reporting, and away from the intensive detail of descriptive narrative to the sense-making, lessons learned and 'so what?' elements of reporting. This strategy means that while more comprehensive reports are submitted to donors in due course, overview reports are circulated internally and with partners within days of activities being

completed. This is complemented by the real-time management/coordination discussions that pivot programming as it is underway.

1. Coordinated by Reconciliation Pillar

1.1. Reinforcing the Pieri process architecture, with renewed emphasis on stakeholder responsibilities for implementation and consequences for non-implementation (Outcomes 1,2,3,4; Strategic Directions 1,2.a,3,4)

This intervention will involve ongoing dialogue with communities supporting progressively more detailed substance to a Community Partnership Agreement. It will also support ad-hoc responses to the needs of the context such as advocacy, dialogues, good offices, negotiation, and shuttle diplomacy to reduce tensions and promote cooperation. The consortium partners will create regular opportunities for constructive interactions between communities to build trust and relationships. The evaluation of phase I found that formal and grassroot peace processes helped to anchor the ABP in local priorities. The involvement of the partners in the peace process combined with a flexible approach is critical in ensuring the programme's relevance. Throughout Phase I, such ad-hoc interventions were successful in preventing attacks and mobilizations. These responses help the local governance structures to respond to communal violence in a timely manner and increase involvement and ownership over the peace process.

Activities

- Community re-engagement initiative to triangulate assessments of community perception and priorities, following mobilization [All Partners]
- Systematic, sustained engagement with communities through partner field staff and systems [NP, Peace Canal]
- Progressive drafting of Community Partnership Agreement [Peace Canal, NP, UNMISS RoLAS, UNMISS HRD]
- Cumulative inter-communal Conference to endorse the output of the Community Partnership Agreement process. [All Partners, led by Peace Canal, NP]

1.2. Strengthening capabilities of local inter-communal and local peace structures governance mechanisms (Outcomes 2,4; Strategic Directions 2,3,4)

The inter-communal focus of the engagement will be the Inter-communal Governance Structures – the representative bodies of women, youth and traditional leadership from across the Area; one each per County. The structures were originally proposed in the Pieri Agreement:

> 3.5 The Youth Leaders will form a Peace Implementation Committee that will be the appropriate channel for reporting and peacefully responding to any future cattle related incidents.
>
> [...]
>
> 4.3 The traditional chiefs call for the establishment of a Traditional Leaders' Circuit Court that moves through the three communities to address inter-communal issues. The Court would be responsible for addressing issues of inter-communal raiding, abductions and violence, and disputes over abducted children, and women.
>
> [...]
>
> 5.6 Women propose the formation of a Women's Peace Committee, and three (one from each community) appointed as an initial Steering Committee. They request being given a uniform of the same colour and this committee is the one to move from Dinka Bor to Murle to Lou Nuer as a Committee that preaches peace. If the women are together in a location, youth may also fear to attack.

This regular forum will be an anchor point for a higher-level community consultation under all three pillars. First, the integrated consortium preparation for the meetings will reach consensus on overall priorities. Second, after the meetings, the conclusions of the engagements will be the basis on which the ARG as a whole will iterate workplans and priorities so that sequencing is aligned to community consensus. Increasing emphasis will be given to the continuity in these structures, so that more progress can be made in each consecutive meeting. Between meetings, shuttle diplomacy and follow up activities will continue on the ground to strengthen confidence in these structures as the focal point for resolution of inter-communal concerns. The structures will continue to include all key communities: Gawaar and Lou Nuer, Dinka Bor and Murle. The Jikany are involved in the conflict system but the current analysis indicates that if in this next phase progress is consolidated among the existing communities, it will be sufficient for stabilizing the environment. However, they will be included at key strategic moments,

based on community feedback. Similarly, the ABP will remain engaged with the ongoing PfPRR discussions regarding Ulang and Nasir to explore complementarity.

At the communal level, each community has its existing mechanisms for resolving conflict at the inter-communal level there are two dimensions to the logic:

> **Relationally:** narratives flourish most when there is no compelling counter-narrative. The narratives between these three communities rely in part on perpetuating stereotypes and avoiding opportunities for stakeholders to connect meaningfully at a human level. Frequent interactions between key representatives of the community-level structures supports relationship-building, trust-building and, ultimately, resilience against conflict drivers between the communities that are often based on the wholly negative stereotypes of 'the other'.
>
> **Practically:** community engagement demonstrates that violence for the majority of the community is endorsed as a last resort, not a first resort: i.e. they accept it as a solution when they see no practical alternative to addressing their grievances or their needs. If the community structures can begin to offer concrete, mutually satisfactory remedies to disputes, then community confidence will build in these forums. For example, if I have confidence in this non-violent mechanism for having cattle returned, or a death compensated, then it is in my interested to use that mechanism before resorting to the high-risk retaliation approach.

These lines of communication and systems at the community level for prevention, response and remedy are necessary conditions for a sustained peace. They are not sufficient. It is critical that these interventions are coupled with material peace dividends on the development track. At the same time, these forums will provide a focal point for other peace and development actors to observe and consult with the community in a structured and more representative way.

Phase 02 will build on the experience of Phase 01 in four ways: (i) ensuring that the meetings of the structures are predicated from the outset on a commitment to sustained engagement (i.e. incidents will not be a legitimate excuse for failure to attend); (ii) conversations will focus on continuity in the representation of the structures so that each meeting can build on previous meetings; (iii) increased work on the preparatory phase of meetings, so the time in-person can be maximised; (iv) building in incentives for the communities to make the benefits of the process salient. These may include earmarked peace dividend participatory budgeting for the meetings. So, the structures will be both a conflict management mechanism, an inter-communal decision-making mechanism, and a peace dividend identification mechanism.

Given the persistence of violence by Murle youth and its negative impact on the sustained implementation of the peace, in late 2022 partners supported the creation of the Age Set Council. This recognises two related dynamics: first, that the absence of a credible body of interlocutors on the Murle side (for their diffuse leadership structure) was undermining clear progress in the inter-communal process; second, the internal issues within the GPAA were themselves in part drivers of the inter-communal raids against the Nuer and Dinka and, similarly, there was no sustained cross-Murle internal forum for addressing these issues peacefully. The current logic of intervention sees this as a gap that can now be bridged through the Age Set Council. The current analysis is that national level elite politics are a contributing but not determining factor in the internal dynamics, and therefore this community-based mechanism is a viable entry point for substantive change. The RoLAS led research under Stabilisation will shed further light on this and pivots will be made as required.

The local structures will supplement the inter-communal aspect. Women and youth will be supported to channel their leadership status into social cohesion and reconciliation initiatives. The WPTs, YPTs, early warning and early response (EWER) committees and local governance structures, which serve as local mechanisms for conflict management, community security and social cohesion, will continue to be established and/or strengthened. These groups will be supported and strengthened to create safe spaces for youth, women and girls and make them more responsive to survivor needs. The safe spaces will be used to discuss their concerns and past experiences, possibly diving into root causes of the conflict, as well as to facilitate trust building among conflicting groups. The partners will also seek to create safe spaces for other community groups such as security and state actors, elderly and religious and spiritual leaders to share their concerns, and perspectives about the root causes of conflict. The WPTs will also be encouraged to play a role in supporting the reintegration process of abductees and generate a higher acceptance of their return.

These local structures will be the primary avenue for addressing intra-communal issues, and may also lead to identification of specific emergent activities under the pooled budget. We cannot assume that repeating intra-communal dialogue initiatives in a pre-programmed way will bridge the gap that currently exists. The theory of change also assumes that if we make sufficient progress on the primary intervention points (in peacebuilding inter-communally and very locally, in stabilisation/accountability, and through resilience opportunities), that this will lead to an increase in stability on these intra-communal issues.

The community governance structures will be the key programmatic interface between the communities and the ARG, feedback which will be triangulated through the ongoing perceptions surveys of the Bridge Network. Decisions of the inter-communal governance structures will clarify the targeting and prioritization of all partners, and where categorically unforeseen

resourcing is needed, this can be discussed through the crisis modifier modality. To ensure financial accountability, decisions on the use of the crisis modifier will be agreed by the ARG and communicated to the Fund Secretariat (FS). The FS will also be provided with ARG meeting minutes recording such decisions.

Activities

- Bi-monthly Inter-communal Governance Structure meetings [All partners, led by Peace Canal]
- Regular engagement of the local structures (YPTs, WPTs) [NP]
- Specific engagement of the Age Set Council as a focal point in the Murle community for intra-communal (age set) and inter-communal issues [Peace Canal, NP]
- [Emergent activities based on the decisions and priorities of the Inter-communal Governance Structures, at a minimum implementing women-led priority actions]

1.3. Supporting mediation of local-level conflicts and implementation of local peace processes (Outcome 1,2,4; Strategic Directions 1,2,3)

The consortium partners will continue to facilitate sessions with community structures to identify appropriate conflict mitigation alternatives to pave the way for locally led peace processes, while also preventing spoilers from derailing an internally stable environment. Such interventions will be applied in both a systematic and ad hoc manner; systematically to ensure continued growth in skills, capacity and confidence in local structures, and ad hoc to respond with agility to intercede escalations in violence. To the extent that, the partners will also facilitate and support peaceful atonement ceremonies and other forms and opportunities of reconciliation identified by the communities. These structures will also be used to inform where and for whom resilience pillar activities will be implemented.

Activities

- Ad hoc peace dialogues to address intra-communal issues, in coordination with local authorities [Peace Canal, NP]
- [Emergent activities mutually agreed through ad hoc intra-communal agreements]

1.4. Abductions prevention and response (Outcome 1,2; Strategic Directions 1,2,3,4)

This intervention will involve family tracing, negotiations, transportation (via road and flights), reunification and interim and primary care for those assaulted, and reintegration support to abductees. These activities have proven to be effective, necessary, and highly salient between communities during Phase I. The consortium partners will continue to support communities to be better prepared to deal with abductee returns and increase their acceptance and willingness to support the process of abductee return and the subsequent reintegration process. The partners will provide continued case management support for recovered abductees, including family tracing and reunification, and establish best interest determination mechanisms and conduct related assessments, undertake registration of the unaccompanied (and separated) children in alternative care and ensure that they receive regular monitoring visits.

Extraction will make use of commercial or chartered flights to interim care centers located in reunification areas. These include Duk, Pibor, Pieri, Juba, Walgak and Bor. The consortium members will coordinate support to survivors at the interim care centers, including a particular focus on psycho-social support. Awareness and sensitisation activities and materials will be provided in targeted areas. The partners will support communities to trace separated children and their locations, where possible, as part of reconciliation efforts.

The UN Security Council identifies abduction of children (women and girls as well) as one of the six great grave violations of Human Rights. These violations will be addressed systematically through a laid down UN led mechanisms coordinated by the UNMISS Human Rights Division (UNMISS/HRD) and supported by the UNMISS Rule of law. UNMISS HRD will take lead in the systematic gathering of accurate, timely, objective and reliable information on the violations committed against children, women and girls within the project area. In addition to the international legal framework, the national law of South Sudan recognizes 'kidnapping and abduction' as a punishable offence.

Activities

- Provide Air transfer support, including flights for abductees upon release [SCI]
- Support case management processes for recovered abductees, including family tracing and reunification, and other appropriate services [SCI]
- Construct and renovate interim care centres in Duk, Pibor, Pieri and Bor, Juba and Walgak field locations [SCI]

- Support formerly abducted women and children with appropriate MHPSS services including referrals upon release and during reintegration [SCI]
- Support community-based awareness-raising events and protection messaging [SCI]
- Training for frontline (25 pax) staff on child protection case management, GBV case management, FTR/IDTR, alternative care, CPIMS+ and MHPSS [SCI]
- Training for frontline project staff & community-based stakeholders on PSEA, gender-mainstreaming, child safeguarding, and accountability to affected populations [SCI]
- Identifying and training foster care givers on alternative care [SCI]
- Government advocacy and engagement, infrastructural support and strategy iteration [UNHCR]
- Public communications advocacy strategy and implementation on prevention of abduction [HRD, SCI, UNHCR]

1.5. Rapid response to avert mobilization and escalation of violence unforeseen threats to stability of the operating environment (Outcome 1, Strategic Direction 2)

A rapid response mechanism will be a key intervention to act swiftly and dissuade the escalation of conflict and continue with the path for violence reduction. The evaluation of Phase I found the flexible funding arrangement in the CVR programme, complemented by partners' own internal resources, to be crucial for the success of the project. An agile response intervention in a rapidly changing programme environment will remain crucial to maximising impact in targeted areas and across the sub-region. This will also include support to strengthen the ability of local governance structures to respond to communal violence in a timely and effective manner, increase ownership over the process, and prevent the onset or escalation of violence.

Activities

- ARG coordinated missions to field to respond to signals of escalating violence [All partners, Reconciliation Pillar led]
- Coordinated by Stabilisation Pillar

2. Coordinated by Stabilization Pillar

The consortium partners will continue focusing on grassroots-driven solutions identified in ABP Phase I. Interventions will strengthen community-based mechanisms to reduce violence and resulting impunity and peacefully resolve disputes. Proposed activities draw on continued engagement with formal and informal justice actors in Jonglei and GPAA, observations and recommendations from the Phase I evaluation, and the research project on perceptions of justice in Jonglei and GPAA carried out in cooperation with the Bridge Network during Phase I. Relevant focus areas may involve activities to strengthen formal justice chain actors to the extent they have been or will be (during Phase II) established in targeted areas (in particular, police and prison services in the near term). The activities will also aim to build the confidence of conflict-affected population groups by increasing legal awareness and empowering communities to make informed decisions on how to seek redress for disputes and enforce their rights through traditional and formal justice mechanisms, including support to victims through access to legal aid with emphasis on vulnerable groups such as women and children.

Fostering mutual understanding and cooperation between formal actors and informal justice actors and building the capacity of informal justice actors to resolve intra- and inter-communal violence in a peaceful manner will remain key focus areas of interventions and ensure alignment with the national and international legal frameworks. All interventions will be carried out in close coordination with the consortium partners in the reconciliation and resilience pillars to ensure independency and maximize impact on targeted areas.

2.1. Strengthening community dispute resolution and building linkages between the informal and formal justice systems (Outcomes 3 and 4, Strategic Directions 1,2b):

Jonglei and GPAA continue to experience violence characterized by intra- and inter-communal violence among the Dinka, Murle and Nuer communities. The narratives of perpetrators continue to justify these attacks as revenge for past grievances and as the only option in the absence of a statutory rule of law presence capable of adequately responding to and resolving such grievances. Nevertheless, community led initiatives and mechanisms play a critical role in resolving disputes and strengthening the rule of law, reducing violence and combatting impunity. Informal authorities are often the only actors present to address disputes and issue decisions. However, while addressing cases outside their jurisdiction and without comprehensive knowledge of written laws and human rights standards, many informal authorities act outside their authority, commit abuses themselves and risk causing further violence and perpetuating discriminatory practices and human rights abuses, including against traditionally disenfranchised groups such as women and children.

Activities

- Identify entry points to support and enhance the capacity of existing formal justice actors in the four ABP locations with a particular focus on South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) and National Prison Services (NPS) and paralegals, while seeking avenues for other actors in the justice chain to serve these locations [UNDP/UNMISS RoLAS];
- Support and strengthen existing informal justice mechanisms in the four ABP locations and in other priority locations across Jonglei and GPAA to resolve intra-communal disputes and in preparation of the establishment and deployment of a traditional leaders' circuit court as envisaged under the Pieri Action for Peace [UNMISS RoLAS];
- Support the establishment of a traditional leaders' circuit court and its deployment to three locations across Jonglei and GPAA to address inter-communal violence [UNMISS RoLAS];
- Build and strengthen linkages between and among formal and informal justice mechanisms across Jonglei and GPAA through exchange visits, joint trainings and conferences [UNMISS RoLAS];
- Research on the historical and current social, political, and socio-economic role of abductions of women and children as part of the inter-communal conflict in Jonglei and GPAA with a focus on potential prevention and rapid response mechanisms [UNMISS RoLAS]; and,
- Support community members, particularly disenfranchised groups such as women and youths, to take on managerial roles to establish context-adapted mechanisms for community security through the integration of rule of law and accountability elements in trainings and capacity building activities of police and community relations committees (PCRCs), WPTs and YPTs [UNDP/UNMISS RoLAS].

2.2. Enhancing accountable and responsible community-led local governance mechanisms (Outcome 2; Strategic Direction 2b)

Weak governance and security institutions at the state and local levels across Jonglei and GPAA continue to perpetuate intra- and inter-communal violence. As a result, the communities have resolved to establish an intercommunal governance structure as a platform for delegations from the Dinka, Murle, Lou Nuer and Gawaar Nuer communities to meet on a regular basis in rotating locations and address inter-communal conflicts and challenges to prevent violent escalations.

Phase II of the ABP will seek to support the meetings and resolutions of the structure with the reconciliation pillar spearheading efforts for its establishment and the stabilization pillar.

Activities

- Support and capacity-building of justice and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms set up based on the structure's resolutions including the traditional leaders' circuit court [UNMISS RoLAS].

2.3. Advocacy (cross-cutting, Strategic Directions 4, 5):

Activities will also aim to build the confidence of conflict-affected population groups by increasing legal awareness and empowering communities to make informed decisions on how to seek redress for disputes and enforce their rights through traditional and formal justice mechanisms, including support to victims through access to legal aid with emphasis on vulnerable groups such as women and children.

Activities

- Inclusion of community representatives in capacity building activities targeted at informal justice actors and community-based security mechanisms to enhance communities' understanding of the national legal framework on justice mechanisms and rights [UNMISS RoLAS/UNDP];
- Support national and sub-national frameworks to address accountability for criminalised acts such as abduction and cattle raiding [UNMISS RoLAS];
- Provision of support to victims through access to legal aid [UNDP].
- Public communications campaign on prevention of abduction (UNHCR
- Government advocacy and engagement, infrastructural support and strategy iteration (UNHCR)
- Integration of protection considerations in all activities (UNHCR)

3. Coordinated by Resilience Pillar

Since the Pieri peace conference in March 2021, lack of viable livelihood opportunities, loss of assets (livestock, individual and communal property, etc.) and limited infrastructure development have been mutually recognized between the different communities of Jonglei and GPAA as both drivers of conflict and opportunities to reinforce peace. The Pieri Action for Peace (March 2021) and subsequent addendum (October 2021) highlight the need for livelihood and infrastructure development, primarily to support youth and women's economic empowerment and transition to sustainable livelihoods beyond conflict.

Through the resilience pillar, the consortium aims to address the economic and developmental marginalization and exclusion of the targeted areas through informal learning and livelihood development activities and to open up paths for longer-term and broader investments in human capital development and socio-economic integration. The partners will offer activities, services and opportunities as peace dividends that will help reduce the incentive to resort to violence which, for many, is the only viable livelihood opportunity at present. Activities will build off and strengthen existing livelihood activities, seeking to support livelihood transformation rather than diversification. The ABP aims to strengthen the livelihoods that people already have, rather than influencing to change them. The resilience pillar will achieve its objectives through (1) constructing and/or rehabilitating household and community assets in ways that reinforce peace and reconciliation between and within communities; (2) engaging youth in informal education and training, focussing on promotion of literacy and peace-making skills; (3) strengthening and transforming livelihoods through the protection of livestock assets and skills development; and (4) empowering community-based structures to mitigate and manage resource-based conflicts.

Targeting and Activity Selection (Strategic Directions 2, 3, and 5)

In line with Strategic Directions 2, 3, and 5, specific locations and target groups will be determined through community governance structure meetings outlined under the reconciliation pillar to ensure that communities are in the lead of deciding who will receive resilience-oriented support and where. Building on lessons learned of phase I, the consortium partners will pursue geographic convergence at the boma and/or cattle camp level, rather than having only county-level convergence. Consultations will be undertaken to understand whether the same youth and women groups could be targeted as participants in multiple activities within the resilience pillar and across the pillars. On the one hand, multiple activities ensure that capacity strengthening support such as training and non-formal education opportunities evolve into viable livelihood opportunities and produce the desired socio-economic advancement. On the other hand, there is a risk of overburdening target participants to a point of diminishing returns. There is therefore a need to balance layering of multiple types of support to the same individuals while respecting care and other duties that could limit this level of convergence. Recognizing that the various forms of conflict which persist in the target areas have resulted in livelihood and asset losses, the consortium will support the creation or rehabilitation of household and communal assets based on community-defined priorities in each location.

To the extent possible, priority activities will be agreed with members of selected locations through a harmonized community based participatory planning (CBPP) exercise. Immediately after selecting a boma or cattle camp with the community governance structure, the consortium will convene CBPP sessions to capture key information about the community such as livelihoods (e.g., agriculture, livestock, migration, etc.), shocks and stressors, needs, aspirations, and conflict dynamics. The partners will use the CPBB results to tailor activities to local requirements and validate them with the community, ensuring localization and ownership by communities.

Through the community governance structures (reconciliation), general target populations and areas will be determined and targeting criteria discussed and validated. At community level, the CBPP will be used as a platform to disseminate information on targeting, recognizing it will not be possible to target 100 percent of households/individuals in a given location. While standard targeting criteria are already determined (i.e., focus on armed youth, women), prioritization within these groups will be based on additional vulnerability criteria such as:

- Households with a high dependency ratio (one income earner for 5+ members), with time and labour availability to devote to project activities;
- Female-headed households, particularly those recently widowed or abandoned;
- Split up households (i.e., where some household members were sent away in search of food);
- Households facing zero-sum coping or employing severe negative coping mechanisms.

While specific activities will be decided by the targeted communities at the community level within the first quarter of the implementation period, the following high-level interventions will be prioritized, building on successes and lessons of Phase I.

3.1. Community assets in conflict hotspots (Outcomes 1, 4, 5, 6; Strategic Directions 2,5)

This intervention will apply a mix of food assistance (provision of food rations) and community and household asset creation activities agreed during the CBPP at each boma or cattle camp. Given that targeted areas are facing extreme or severe food insecurity, participating households will receive food assistance during each lean season (six months). The food assistance will ensure that people undertaking asset creation activities (and participating in other ABP activities, when applicable) have enough caloric intake for labour intensive activities. The food assistance will be key to ensuring that households are able to devote time to asset creation activities, community dialogue, and other activities instead of resorting to alternative (negative) coping strategies to meet household food needs. This is essential to ensuring that food security is not compromised during the lean season in favour of participation in ABP activities. Based on the lessons learned from Phase I, the expected asset creation activities can largely be grouped into five broad categories:

- **Assets to preserve or enhance mobility:** Livelihoods in the targeted areas are built around freedom of movement, with mobility as a critical resource. The impact of conflict and climate shocks on mobility is a key intersection of conflict and strongly informs how and why organized violence occurs. Protecting or enhancing mobility will allow communities to take advantage of seasonal food opportunities and market access and support agro-pastoral livelihoods which also require semi-annual transhumance migration between relatively permanent, wet-season settlements and larger, more condensed, temporary dry-season cattle camps. Enhanced mobility will also establish and improve connections within and between communities, which is consistently cited as a key mechanism for peacebuilding and peace maintenance.
- **Assets to manage/control water, including flooding:** Given the escalating magnitude of flooding in Jonglei and GPAA and the overlap of recurrent pockets of food insecurity and organised violence, both rain and riverine flooding are relevant to mobility and affect competition over natural resources such as pasture. The ABP will therefore prioritise flood control assets for the protection of productive land and household and communal infrastructure. Enhancing the community's ability to mitigate the impact of excess water, especially when organised violence keeps them from making use of typical elevated ground, will directly contribute to both food security and social cohesion. Similarly, allowing communities to retain water collected during the rainy season will help mitigate conflict over or around water resources in the dry season. Mapping out the transhumance routes against the areas of conflicts and water points will improve pastoralists access to limited water resources and peace dividends and will alleviate pressures on water resources. The consortium will also conduct an environmental risk assessment as it also recognises that any changes in the movement and storage of water may have a wide range of positive and negative impacts, including conflict over redirected water flows.
- **Assets to improve living conditions within cattle camps:** Livestock losses due to raids as well as flood-related diseases and mortality render cattle keeping youth extremely vulnerable to food insecurity. This risk is higher for the youth living in cattle camps where external assistance rarely reaches due to inaccessibility, especially during the rainy season, and security concerns about armed youth. Thus, the consortium will intentionally target youth living in cattle camps and moving with cattle as well as the permanent settlements to which the youth are connected. Investments in cattle camp assets may range from assets (e.g., fencing) to demarcate agricultural land and prevent grazing on crops, to assets to improve access to water for people and animals, up to assets for increased security such as the construction of look-out posts to prevent raids. Other assets may include market stalls or cattle kraal (enclosures) to support livestock trade and marketing of livestock products.
- **Assets to improve livestock health and feeding practices:** Extreme climate disasters (floods) which hit Jonglei and GPAA areas recently caused massive losses of livestock. Small ruminants were particularly affected due to their higher susceptibility. Their smaller sizes make them easily drown and starve. Traditional pastoral practice of 'free ranging' for ruminants is therefore increasingly becoming less and less viable in preserving ruminant stocks under extreme climate. In addition, displacement and stiffer competition over remaining pasturelands is considered a major cause of inter-communal tension especially along migratory pathways and conflict fault lines. This intervention will support women to hive out designated sections around cattle camps to grow nutrient rich fodder as part of climate adaptation and DRR. Assets such as vegetative fencing will be created within/near cattle camps to provide fodder for small ruminants, particularly focused around dry-season animal food needs.
- **Assets to reduce hunger:** While the primary focus of the ABP will be on physical infrastructure to protect and preserve livelihood assets and connect within and with targeted areas other asset creation activities will be undertaken to specifically address hunger as a cause of conflict. Communal and household level assets to promote localized food production will be undertaken around more permanent settlements, particularly in communities whose livelihoods are agro-pastoral. The consortium will support crop farming and vegetable gardening, including climate-smart agricultural training, to improve production and productivity and hence enhance food availability at the household level throughout the year.

3.2. Livelihood support, including for alternative livelihoods, for armed youth and women in conflict hotspots (Outcomes 1, 5, 6; Strategic Direction 1, 5)

Recognizing the centrality of livestock for social and economic activities within the targeted areas, the consortium will scale up activities to improve livestock health and marketing of livestock products. This support will target all livestock-owning households in the targeted areas and will maintain contingency resources to provide animal health services to support the return of cattle within the framework of reconciliation. Primary currency for compensating loss of lives between communities in Jonglei remain cattle. Such returned cattle are taken through a formal inter-party verification process that involves local authorities and community representatives as witnesses. The consortium will support the verification process with community animal health workers (CAHWs) who will conduct health checks and perform treatment and vaccination on the returned herds before handing them over to rightful beneficiaries.

- **Train women and youth as skilled Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs):** This activity aims to equip 250 women and youth (150 (100Y, 50W)-in Jonglei and 100 (70Y, 30-W) in GPAA with technical skills in basic veterinary care and support them to progressively transform into community's own resource persons. Building upon the gains of RSRTF Phase I and synergy from other ongoing livestock vaccination and treatment programs in Jonglei and GPAA, the intervention will expand the pool of skilled women and youth available for frontline livestock care in cattle camps. This is expected to provide a significant incentive for armed youth to drop their guns in pursuit of a more meaningful career in the livestock sub-sector that largely defines their lives. Participants will be selected from cattle camps which are considered hotspots and will be trained at the same locations. The consortium will deliver the technical module while the State Directorate of Veterinary Services will convene the sessions and conduct the trainings. A list of graduated CAHWs will then be developed by the State Ministry of Livestock and Animal Resources and circulated to cattle camp heads for reference and call.
- **Train CAHWs on service business skills and market scoping for privatization of their services:** This activity will equip CAHWs (both newly trained and those carried forward from phase I) with basic business knowledge and service marketing techniques to use their acquired capacity in livestock care for income generation. The willingness of cattle owners to spend resources to keep their cattle healthy is considered an untapped opportunity in cattle camps for income generating activities. Currently, most livestock treatment services in cattle camps are donor supported with CAHWs receiving incentives in return for the work they do. The aim of this intervention is to progressively wean the trained CAHWs from dependency on donor support and chart their own income generating paths.
- **Support linkage and networking meetings with veterinary commodity stockists/vendors:** Trained CAHWs who wish to venture into basic veterinary services as private practitioners will need essential drugs and other commodities to be effective. This intervention will seek to link the CAHWs directly with veterinary commodity vendors for increased access and expanded opportunity for future trading. A quality assurance mechanism including veterinary drugs storage network will be established to ensure efficacy is maintained and expiries checked.
- **Provide incentives for 60 CAHWs to carry out livestock interventions (vaccination and treatment campaigns):** This activity will benefit from the existing synergy with VSF-Germany's ongoing vaccination and treatment project in Jonglei and GPAA. Veterinary drugs will be made available (limited to the scope of the existing resources) while vaccines will be obtained through partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The ABP will therefore support the CAHWs with incentives to conduct treatment and vaccination drives in designated camps for a total of 3 months per year. It will not only build trust with the camp fraternity due to reduced cattle mortality from communicable diseases but also preserve the communities' livestock. The net effect is expected to be reduced propensity to raid.
- **Train cattle camp-based women and girls in management of small ruminants:** Part of the lessons learned during the implementation of previous livestock projects in the area is that small ruminants (goats and sheep also known as shoats) are culturally more accessible to women as an economic resource compared to cattle which is purely a men's domain. The intervention will build and strengthen the capacity of cattle-camp based women and girls to more effectively care for these small ruminants to serve as a safety net for their households during extreme hunger or during flood-induced displacement. This is expected to boost women's adaptability to climate shocks and enhance their livelihoods, enhanced. The resilience of cattle camp communities shall then be strengthened, therefore contributing to minimizing the drive to conduct raids.
- **Support women and youth groups to identify viable livestock product value chains (hides, milk products etc) and link them to market:** This activity may be linked to Output 3.3 and will support women and youth to organize themselves into IGA groups for economic empowerment. The groups will then be taken through basic livestock value chain analysis so that they can appreciate existing pathways for business. Products targeted will include milk, hides and skins, horn carvings, chicken feed, small ruminants' fodder etc). In addition, successful IGA groups will be supported with a basic start-up kit as foundational capital and be coached through incubation. All these will be conducted during the first year of ABP Phase II to allow sufficient time for incubation.

3.3. Informal learning opportunities for armed youth and cattle camps: 'Learning Together – Growing together' Peace and Life-skills Development (Outcomes 4, 5; Strategic Direction 1,5)

Priority is given to implementing a conflict-sensitive and integrated non-formal learning intervention that directly engages armed and at-risk youth. The objective is to contribute to restoring peaceful social coexistence, improving stability and strengthening the resilience of this group in Jonglei and GPAA. In light of the immediate need for a reduction in mobilization, it is of critical importance to leverage non-formal education that focuses on the promotion of literacy, peacemaking awareness and other life-skills for armed and at-risk youth. Participation in productive activities has a direct effect on the intensity and frequency of mobilization and subsequent violence on one hand. On the other hand, participation will expose the targeted armed and at-risk youth to integrated and comprehensive peace and life-skills support that is designed to deter armed and at-risk youth from resorting to violence and incentivizes these groups to take on leadership roles as future agents of peace.

The consortium's *'Learning Together – Growing together' Peace and Life-skills Development Program* is an adapted Functional Adult Literacy (FAL) curriculum that seeks to engage 480 armed/at-risk youth learners in a learning process that equips them with the basic understanding of reading, writing, numeracy and life skills but also facilitates their active participation in community structures and peace building mechanisms. In this way addressing marginalization and exclusion from decision processes through empowerment, which are key drivers of conflict.

By layering the envisaged learning process with other interventions planned under the other pillars and by aligning population targeting, this learning curriculum will directly generate positive change and reduce violence as armed and at-risk youth will be equipped with contextualized and localized life skills to be productive in their communities, manage their livelihood activities, mitigate conflicts and support community security programmes, thus presenting alternatives to violent engagement and creating incentives for de-mobilization. Further, and building on the successes of IOM/UNESCO's "Youth Action for Reduced Violence and Enhanced Social Cohesion in Wau, South Sudan" project – which engaged youth gangs involved in criminal and violent behaviour – armed and at-risk youth can be supported to act as leaders and be trained to empower and share knowledge gained during this peace learning process with others within the community as agents of change during and subsequent to the conclusion of the intervention. While priority is given to strictly targeting armed youth (I.e., young people between the age of 18 and 35 years who are engaging or have recently engaged in criminal and violent behavior, including cattle raiding, gang-related violence, and SGBV), targeting and identification exercises will account for the possibility of (1) a low concentration of armed youth in certain locations (2) and/or a possibly low-degree of willingness to participate in the planned activities. This implies that targeting criteria can expand, depending on initial assessments in targeted locations, to include at-risk youth (I.e., young people between the age of 18 and 35 years whose vulnerability makes them more susceptible to engage in unlaw/violent/criminal behaviour compared to their peers and can be involved with violence as a victim, offender, or witness), in the case where targeting armed youth only is not possible.

The envisaged aims of the learning programme and associated peace dividends are summarized below:

- Equipping armed and at risk-youth with literacy (reading and writing), numeracy and financial management skills (e.g., Introduction to table banking using VSLA methodology). The acquisition of these skills is designed to reinforce and echo the envisaged livelihood interventions (e.g., vocational training, FFA, etc.) under this pillar as participants in the learning programme will also benefit from these interventions. The overarching aim of this parallel effort is to support income generation and encourage an immediate application of the acquired skills in daily socio-economic activities.
- Mainstreaming civic participation, decision-making and peacemaking messages in the adapted FAL curriculum with the aim of contributing towards conflict transformation through non-formal learning which will reinforce the role of the targeted youth as future leaders and agents of peace. This will strengthen and complement the interventions envisaged under the Reconciliation and Stabilization pillars. By ensuring coordination in participant targeting and content design, this complementarity can ensure sustainability of investments made across all pillars beyond the ABP period. The approach takes a point of departure in a localization approach that seeks to build national capacity through the aggregate experience, knowledge and skills of all partners in the consortium by facilitating community driven approaches to peacebuilding, and strengthening individual, community and institutional capacity as relevant.
- This learning process will be grounded in the utilization of three essential tools; (1) a localized and integrated curriculum that expands IOM's existing Functional Adult Literacy (FAL) Curriculum, that integrates new modules, takes into consideration key priorities in target locations as identified through the CBPP process and builds on lessons learned, knowledge and experience from interventions under other pillars both in Phase I and II; (2) Identification and deployment of facilitators who play a critical role in the learning process as they aid learners in the identification of their needs, statement of their priorities, implementation of the learning program and evaluation of the learning process; (3) Supporting participants in practicing their skills through village savings loan/micro financing schemes. VSLAs and start up kits are cost effective

approaches to ensuring sustainability and utility of trainings on the adapted FAL curriculum. The VSLA formation and provision of any start up kits will be contextualised to the geographic locations, and the specific activities possible in the locations based on participants self-identified priorities. As some locations are remote, the VSLA methodology may not be relevant, and alternative support that achieves the objective of bringing to life the trainings will be identified; (4)The learning programme includes preparing learning spaces (basic structures if nothing exists or basic rehabilitation works with local materials), and will explore options for cash for work modality with participants of the VSLA to kickstart this with small levels of capital.

3.4. Local capacity for resource management (Outcomes 1-5; Strategic Directions 1,2,5)

The intervention will be led by CAHW who will be supported to mobilize cattle camp leadership and herders to be part of scheduled cattle migration pathway meetings and shared resource mapping. This intervention will be conducted in concert with ABP partners implementing activities under Reconciliation and Stabilization pillars. Resource-specific and rights based intercommunal dialogue around cattle, their movement, common pasture, watering points etc is expected to promote the culture of joint management of these resources. It is hoped this will minimize violent contestation and foster peaceful sharing thereby contributing to enhanced peaceful coexistence. The objective is to make cattle migration more predictable and shared resource use more peaceful. Due to poor communication networks in the targeted areas, the project will establish inter communal communication channels for ease of planning and consensus. Reconciliation pillar partners' activities will help unclog inter-communal communication channels with a view to restoring peaceful coexistence.

Resilience activities will provide women and youth with skills and capacity to pursue alternative livelihoods. This in concert with interventions from other pillars will contribute to strengthening their agency and self-reliance and keeping them away from mobilization for violence. Joint natural resource management strategies will provide opportunity for intercommunal consensus on sharing thus reducing resource driven inter-communal violence. These interventions will be delivered in the appointed locations through Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs), women groups, youth groups and local authority. Following recommendations from Phase I evaluation report, focus will be those camps located in (or are in proximity with) inter-communal fault lines and defined hotspots.

Furthermore, as *a general practice, the implementation of asset development activities - particularly those relating to flood control - are accompanied by the development of disaster management strategies and plans accounting for competition over resources that drives conflict.*

4. Coordinated at Program Level

4.1. Redesigned coordination and internal accountability system (Cross-cutting outcomes; Strategic Directions 4,5)

During the first phase of the ABP, progress was made on improving coordination and peer accountability through the ARG mechanisms, both at the program level and at the field level. During Phase 02, this will be formalised with partners to ensure that there are common expectations in this regard. Building on the Evaluation recommendation to ensure greater coherence in future programming, the identification, design and sequencing of activities will be based on agreement within pillars and, where applicable, across the consortium. This means that even where an activity has been foreshadowed in the technical proposal, implementation will be according to mutually agreed, adaptive workplans. This also responds to the evaluation finding that programming should be adaptive and responsive to the context.

Key standing agenda items of Quarterly Review meetings will include:

- Discussion on progress and emerging lessons and proposed pivots (including specific review of ethnographic diaries)
- Conflict sensitivity review of higher risk activities and/or geographies
- Workplan revisions
- Engagement with key government actors
- Review of exit and sustainability strategy outline
- Review of coordination system effectiveness

Activities

- Inception reset meeting [All partners]

- Monthly pillar coordination meetings [By pillar: Peace Canal, RoLAS, WFP]
- Quarterly learning and review meetings [All partners]

4.1. ARG and State/Local Government coordination (Cross-cutting outcomes; Strategic Directions 4,5)

Clear lines of communication with the State and Local authorities, with strategic lines to the national level, is critical for two reasons. In a risk management sense, it supports the mitigation of political level interference in processes that have full support of the community. From an opportunity perspective, it creates space for positive government input, critique and general involvement to be leveraged, and will also be central to the exit strategy. As stewards of the activities, RSRTF partners must ensure that the specific settings of these engagements remain conflict sensitive. Engaging government, for example, does categorically not mean responding positively to any request coming from government. These will be processed through the ARG processes, which ensures balanced responses and mitigates against any confusion and wasted energy that often results from Government forum-shopping.

Activities

- Fortnightly State Government coordination meeting [ABP Coordinator and Pillar Reps – Peace Canal, RoLAS, WFP]
- Quarterly State Government coordination session (during ABP learning and review meeting) [All Partners]

4.1. Community engagement and monitoring mechanism (Cross-cutting outcomes; Strategic Directions 1,4,5)

In Phase 01 the Bridge Network begun data collection through ethnographic diaries. As well as supporting the overall programme monitoring, these will be reinforced in Phase 02 to elicit more targeted feedback on the work of the ABP. This in turn will enable focussed discussion at quarterly review workshop and loops back to Bridge Network and Inter-communal Governance Structures where the ABP needs to clarify implications for ongoing programming. At the inception reset meeting, there will be a further discussion on the specific modalities, including whether community representation should be included in subsequent quarterly review meetings themselves.

Exit and sustainability strategy is critical in general, in particular with the RSRTF modality, and all the more specifically with the planned elections towards the out-months of the programme. The budgeting strategy has earmarked a draw-down line for exit interventions, and these will progressively materialise through the programme. It is important to note that some of these may be relevant quite early in the programme to lay strategic foundations of conflict sensitive exit interventions.

Activities

- Bridge Network ethnographic diary reports data collection [Bridge Network]
- Quarterly review workshop dedicated discussion on ethnographic diaries. [All Partners]
- Exit strategy development, iteration and testing [All Partners]
- Conflict sensitivity spot-checks and standing review (as part of Quarterly Review agenda) [WFP, Peace Canal, NP, third party Supplier]

Explain how the activities above are interrelated and envisaged layering or specific sequencing of activities and why?

How do the different components of the overall intervention build upon one another to achieve the intended outcomes?

Provide specific examples of how the various reconciliation, stabilization, and resilience components are interlinked.

Working across the reconciliation, stabilization and resilience pillars, the consortium will aim to deliver an integrated package of complementary interventions in jointly targeted areas to maximise impact and achieve transformational change. Wherever feasible, geographical and operational convergence will be pursued and strengthened to enhance synergies across all activities and with the partners increasingly moving towards systemic and life-changing interventions. The consortium partners will leverage each organization's strengths to bring quality into each pillar; co-locate, layer, and integrate activities to address conflict drivers in the most marginalized areas and generate positive change by strengthening community and governance structures; and contribute to advancing the triple nexus agenda in Jonglei and GPAA.

The layering of the interventions envisaged within the resilience pillar will be operationalized by aligning population targeting and harmonizing implementation timelines across all activities. Women and youth participating in community and household asset creation will receive material support (food rations) to offset opportunity costs and reduce food gaps during the lean season. The consortium partners will encourage them to participate in other resilience building activities with a lower immediate material reward (e.g., non-formal education including numeracy skills and vocational training). Through combined support (assets, food

provision and life and vocational skills), the ABP will aim to strengthen household and community livelihoods and shift their focus, particularly amongst armed youth, to positive production activities.

Similarly, incentives to participate in activities under the **reconciliation** and **stabilization** pillars will be created and promoted by ensuring that participants in interventions under each of these pillars can also benefit from activities envisaged under the resilience pillar. Community mechanisms and governance structures will be trained and empowered to support coherent coordination of all interventions at community level. Leaders of these structures will be trained and incentivized with in-kind and where possible cash support.

7. POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

Where the absence of state engagement or elite power dynamics have been identified as contributing to the problem to be addressed, describe the political engagement strategy envisaged for the programme. Who are the key changemakers, peace influencers, and spoilers that the programme seeks to engage and how?

The ABP's overall approach to political engagement is based on the assumption that many political actors, if not all, have the capacity to be key changemakers, peace influencers and spoilers. The consortium will adopt a coordinated approach to political engagement within the members and other HDP actors within Jonglei and GPAA. The ARG and sub-working groups will serve as coordination mechanisms to provide and share information, agree on advocacy positions, harmonized support to the state and local authorities, and organize a rapid response to mobilization attempts and the escalation of violence. The ABP's overriding principle of political engagement will be **coordinated, timely, and collective** communication to support both the triangulation that comes with collective conversations around government engagement as well as the mitigation of effects arising from government actors requesting for resources from partners.

ABP Phase II will have specific emphasis on working along the GPAA Naanam corridor. The consortium members have assessed that positive engagement with age-set youth groups in Naanam may/will pivot the overall conflict dynamics and open pathways for a gradual transition from negative to positive peace building across Jonglei and GPAA. Political leaders from both Jonglei and GPAA including the GPAA Chief Administrator and Peace Commissions will be invited for meetings with age-sets and community leaders to collaboratively address insecurity and find long-term solutions for peace. This engagement strategy will recognise these realities and focus on an assessment of the underlying interests of actors, the associated peace and conflict building behaviours and practices, and engagement principles that encourage peace building behaviours and reduce violent behaviours.

A working engagement strategy document will be iterated and adapted:

Table 1: RSRTF Jonglei and GPAA ABP Engagement Strategy Matrix

Actor Group	Interests	Positive Behaviours and Practices	Negative Behaviours and Practices	Engagement Principles
Armed youth leadership	Status / wealth / purpose / legend	Organisation / rapid communication / logistics	Cattle raiding / child abduction / mass mobilisation	Preserve leadership structures / focus on strengths
Armed youth adherents	Belonging / purpose / dignity /protection	Physical resilience / solidarity with community objectives	Cattle raiding / child abduction / mass mobilisation	Focus on opportunities that are sustained not ad hoc
Women	Opportunities and safety for children / Stability / security	Advocating against violence / resilience in nurturing children / advocating for abductee returns	Songs inciting violence / guilting boys/men who do not go for raids / encouraging wealth accumulation	Identifying women leaders and engaging in substantive conversations on the role of women
Traditional leaders	Dignity / Preservation of role / Legacy	Application of customary knowledge to resolve disputes peacefully / leveraging relationships to mitigate conflict drivers / enforcing decisions	Inciting violence / passivity in response to mobilisation /	Acknowledge and amplify leadership role / engage around revival of customary approaches to conflict resolution

Spiritual leaders	Preservation of status / acceptance by community	Addressing community concerns / advocating for community needs	Inciting violence for personal material benefit / bad faith negotiations with humanitarian partners	Maintain respect for spiritual status / make salient indirect benefits of peace for spiritual leader's mandate
County authorities	Economic benefit / community support /legitimacy	Liaising closely with State Government and Partners / accurately communicating community concerns / equitable approach to addressing community concerns / advocacy	Passivity / refusing to cooperate without incentivisation / biased advocacy for community issues / focussing time on upward political manoeuvring	Focus engagement on the benefits for the community and support the County Authorities to be fully engaged and feel appropriate level of ownership for the activities
State Authorities	Results in their portfolio / reputation for action / economic benefit / representing political constituency / legitimacy	Action complementary to humanitarian agencies (not going it alone) / dialoguing with inter-communal political counterparts / promoting peaceful mechanisms for conflict resolution through public engagements	Threatening organisations and agencies / playing off agencies against each other / conflict insensitive community engagement / partisan approaches to conflict issues	Find roles for cross-section of relevant state authorities in key programming / support credit sharing among government partners / Acknowledge and reinforce positive steps / emphasise documentation of requests, conversations
National Authorities	Political power / economic benefit / development / legitimacy	Advocacy for coordination at sub-national level / engagement of actors through national hierarchies of authority (formal and informal)	Manipulation of community and state Leadership through hierarchies (formal and informal) / passivity in conflict response	Maintain strong, regular engagement and high-level information sharing with key line Ministries
Humanitarian Actors	Professional success / institutional survival / resourcing	Collaboration / Coordination / information sharing / Creative solutions	Credit-seeking / competition / withholding information / undermining other agencies / maximising funding allocation	Explicitly incentivise collaboration through Results Framework and reporting requirements

8. COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Summarise the communications strategy to be implemented in support of the collective programming approach. How will unified and consistent messaging be ensured across programme components and partners. How will communities and stakeholders be informed of the programming objectives and interconnected approach. Specifically, how will the consortium ensure that the community perceives the RSRTF actions as dividends of peace, and not initiatives that would be implemented irrespective of violence.

The consortium will develop a communication plan for Phase II during its short its inception workshop. All key messages and public communications will be coordinated by the consortium lead (i.e., the Information Management Officer) to ensure that the ABP objectives of violence reduction and peace dividends, inter-connected interventions, and results as well as behavioural change messages are clear and consistent. Communication activities will include public information dissemination, community dialogues and meetings, as well as liaison with the local authorities and religious, spiritual and community leaders for cascading information. Public information dissemination tools such as the community radio, drama/songs/dances, loudspeakers, bull horn

processions, and peace rallies will be leveraged. Moreover, the consortium members will capitalize on strengthened community governance structures supported under the ABP (e.g., WPTs and WPTs) to spread and reinforce the information within their communities.

Throughout the project cycle, the consortium partners will develop, display, and disseminate ABP visibility items, joint press releases, social media content, videos, and documentaries related to successful human-interest stories and key milestones such as signing of peace dialogue resolutions, return of raided cattle, and abducted children, etc.

9. DESCRIPTION OF TARGET AREAS AND GROUPS

Specify the tentative areas (payams) that will be targeted and why these areas have been selected. Explain how conflict sensitivity considerations have informed selection.

Explain who the target groups are and how/ why these groups have been identified including criteria for selection is applicable. Where possible, disaggregate target groups by age, gender and/or location.

If applicable, briefly describe how accessibility challenges will be mitigated to incorporate target groups in remote locations.

ABP Phase II will primarily target armed youth, cattle camp youth, and women in the identified conflict areas in Kadiang, Weikol-Pulbura corridor, Anyidi-Manyabol-Gumuruk corridor, Nanaam-Bichbich, Keriak-Kotome-Lekuangole corridor and Nyandit-Burmath-Nyargeny corridor. The selected corridors are programmatically and operationally marginalized areas due to their hard-to-reach nature and the violence-related security dynamics, which lead to minimal humanitarian, development and peace investments compared to other locations.

The consortium members have assessed that without addressing drivers of conflict in the aforementioned locations, overall efforts at peace and stability will not be achieved in Jonglei and GPAA. In light of recommendations from the Phase I evaluation, the urban-rural divide in terms of access to resources and services has also been considered to ensure that those residing in rural areas or cattle camps are able to benefit from the ABP's impact. Communities residing in cattle camps will form the preponderance of the ABP target groups.

The geographic scope of ABP Phase II has been strategically designed around access outside of town areas by drawing on the mobile presence of the consortium partners. Simultaneously, the programme seeks to leverage other entry points such as animal health workers who can act as extension agents for the programme in remote cattle camps. This will significantly enhance the programme ability to address the "urban bias" of most programming, which has left many rural areas of South Sudan dispossessed, contributing to the dislocation of communities, including pastoralists. In addition to the urban-rural divide, the programme design addresses exclusion and marginalisation and is committed to actively addressing that key fault line.

The ABP will adopt a community-wide approach that recognizes deeply rooted violence and insecurity areas, targeting young males, women, girls, men and boys, as well as their representatives at both the statutory and customary levels. Female youth will also be targeted, as they experience some of the same frustrations as male youth in terms of access to viable livelihood opportunities and are also encountering the impacts of violence in their communities. In addition, women are at heightened risk of marginalisation due to their substantial duty of care and child, early and forced marriage (CEFM). Local authorities will be engaged throughout the project cycle and will continue to play a key role in mitigating and regulating violence.

Table 2. Target Group, Intervention, Locations

Target Group	Intervention	Location(s)
Women and girls	• Peace dialogues • Women's leadership training • Livelihoods • Local peace structures and institutions • Abductee response and prevention	Central-southern Jonglei and GPAA: Pulbura, Burmath, Kadiang, Nanaam, Keriak, Kotome, Wuno, Nyandit, Lekuangole, Anyidi-Manyabol-Gumuruk corridors.
Armed and at-risk youth	• Peace dialogues • Livelihoods • Non-formal education • Local peace structures and institutions • Abductee prevention	

Men/adults and traditional leaders	• Peace dialogues • Review of formal and in-formal justice mechanisms • Livelihoods • Local peace structures and institutions • Abductee response and prevention	
State and local authorities	• Peace process – systematic and ad-hoc meetings • Assessment and monitoring • Inter-governmental and partner coordination • Institutional strengthening	Jonglei and GPAA

10. EXISTING COMPLEMENTARY ACTIONS / STRUCTURES

Outline existing activities / projects programmes as well as mechanisms / institutions / structures that are already in place that will serve as a baseline on which to build / complement. For example, existing peace building activities or resolutions, services / programmes already in place working with the same target population, existence of community assets, and community structures such as women and youth dialogue platforms/groups etc that are likely to be utilised or expanded in implementation of the project. Specifically, demonstrate how the structures built during Phase I of this programme would be enhanced and/or sustained. Also be sure to note any relevant peacebuilding actions being undertaken by other organisations within the programme area (Shejeh Salam, POF, PBF) or neighbouring areas where synergies might be established.

Across Jonglei and GPAA, WFP provides emergency food assistance, malnutrition treatment and prevention, school feeding, and livelihoods and resilience support in all counties, reaching around 1.4 million people in 2022. WFP's extensive footprint highlights the extremely severe situation of hunger and malnutrition in a context of persistent and growing shocks and stressors. To extend the reach of resilience programming started under ABP Phase I, WFP used complementary funding to scale up its community asset creation programme to other hotspot locations within Jonglei, including Uror (Tiam Payam), Nyirol (Waat Payam), and Akobo East (Bilkey Payam). WFP's complementary funding also enabled the roll-out of the school feeding programme in Akobo West (Walgak and Buong Payams), which have been perceived by the communities benefiting as peace dividends. In coordination with the ARG members, WFP also mobilized internal funding to support partners to respond to emerging issues, facilitating multiple special flights and assessments to Wuno (Pibor) and Kadiang (Jonglei). WFP invests in physical infrastructure (e.g., roads and dykes) for the delivery of humanitarian services and support to more interconnected communities for longer-term socio-economic development. During ABP Phase II, WFP, with its own donor-funded resources, will continue road construction and repair to transform Bor to Kadiang and Bor to Pibor into all-season roads.

The consortium will leverage the operational capacity, local knowledge and thematic experience of three IOM projects that will be operating in Jonglei/GPAA during this project's implementation period; (1) the large-scale World Bank funded project "Enhancing Community Resilience Project" (ECRP I and II) which, grounded in the Local Government Act (2009), facilitates community led development planning processes from the Boma level to the Payam Level and finally feeding into a county level development plan. The development committees are charged with prioritizing needs at the payam and boma levels to enhance access to services and opportunities for enhancing productive capacities. The implementation of ECRP II will begin in 2023 and final locations across GPAA will be determined in consultation with the Government before the project start date. While there might not be complete alignment with ECRP II's current and future locations, the structures created under ECRP remain relevant and their engagement remains critical to ensuring longer-term stabilization in the area; (2) the Dutch-funded "Bor Flood Risk Mitigation Project (BFRMP)" which strengthens capacity for community responses to climate-related shocks through participatory disaster risk management mechanisms and early warning systems at national, state, county, payam, and community levels; (3) the UN Secretary General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)-funded climate security project – to be operational in 2023 – titled "Local Solutions to Build Climate Resilience and Advance Peace and Stability" which will adopt a climate-informed peacebuilding approach that seeks to incentivize collaboration between conflict parties (or their constituents) in Jonglei/GPAA for a common purpose to overcome the impacts of climate change, using climate-related challenges as entry points to build confidence and for technical cooperation and dialogue that lead to joint planning and peacebuilding between conflict parties.

The project will leverage on the already existing coordination forums such as the Case Management Task Force and use of the Child Protection Information Management System (CPIMS+) to ensure standard management of data for formerly abducted children, support coordination of the appropriate Family Tracing and Reunification processes within a coordinated and accountable platform. Support to formerly abducted women will also be coordinated through the GBV Cluster, and this would ensure timely and quality response and referral because NP and SCI are part of the GBV Cluster as well.

In addition to RSRTF phase 1, other projects by VSF Germany in Jonglei and GPAA includes cattle vaccination and treatment targeting all the counties and cash interventions targeting Pibor. These will be expected to contribute to not only leveraging resources but also strengthening trust with community during RSRTF phase II rollout.

Table 3. Existing Mechanisms and Structures Related to Proposed RSRTF Programming

Name	Description	Established / Type	Coverage	Pillar linkage
Pieri Agreement	Murle-Dinka Bor-Nuer (including Gawaar through Addendum) peace agreement	March 2021 / Community agreement	All	All
Inter-communal governance structures	Three structures for Traditional Chiefs / Women / Youth leadership; one under each category from each of the counties in the ABP	October 2021 / Inter-communal leadership structure	All	All
Boma and Payam Development committees (BMDs and PMDs)	BMDs and PMDs created under IOM's World Bank's ECRP project which are charged with prioritizing needs at the payam and boma levels to enhance access to services and opportunities for enhancing productive capacities.	2021/Community institutions	All	All
WPTs & YPTs	Groups in Lou Nuer and Murle communities, which empower members to become active agents for change in their communities. These groups are engaged in all three pillars, important groups in reconciliation programming, linked with the community dispute resolution in stabilisation, and to be targeted for support through resilience.	Staggered dates of establishment, some are from before the RSRTF project while others were established withing Phase I / local community groups	Lou Nuer and Murle	All
Project Management Committees, FFA	Community-based structures which support and oversee implementation of FFA	Staggered dates of establishment and gradual scale up of locations and targeted households from March 2021	Lou Nuer, Murle, Dinka Bor	Resilience
School management committees	Parent/teacher structures that support the implementation of the school feeding programme	Ongoing since post-COVID resumption of schools in Pibor; established in Akobo West in mid-2022; further expansion planned in Jonglei in 2023 through complementary funding	Lou Nuer, Murle	Resilience

With regards to coordination, the ABP will build on the existing coordination platforms in the humanitarian programming, of which the consortium partners are already part. For, instance UNHCR/HRD, SCI and NP are part of the Protection Cluster. To enhance the coordination of interventions such as case management, family tracing and reunification as well as GBV interventions for formerly abducted women and children upon their release, the stabilization partners will leverage on its role as a co-lead of the national Case management Task Force (CMTF) and the Unaccompanied and Separated Children working Group under the umbrella Child Protection Area of Responsibility (CPAoR) as well as the GBV Sub Cluster at the national level. This will help ensure that standard implementation of these activities is aligned to already contextualised standards and tools for South Sudan, to strengthen accountability maintain quality programming and strengthen effective referral and reintegration initiatives. The resilience pillar partners will participate in and contribute to the state level food security and livelihoods cluster, using this as a platform for building other synergies and expanding livelihood support to a wider population.

Phase 02 will continue engaging non-RSRTF funded strategic partners such as UNMISS Civil Affairs and Human Rights Divisions, Political Affairs Divisions, UNPOL, and UNMISS Force and other organisations who are static in Jonglei and GPAA such as the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Promoting Civic Engagement and Peace (PCEP/Shejeh Salam), the World Bank, the Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund (POF), Danish Refugee Council (DRC). The ABP will continue to extend invitations to other strategic partners who wish to be part of the ARG mechanism.

11. EVIDENCE BASED PROGRAMMING / LESSONS LEARNED

Explain how the end-of-programme evaluation of the first phase of this programme has fed into the design of this proposal. Demonstrate which of the evaluation's insights and recommendations have been incorporated into this proposal. Refer to any other analyses and evaluations of past peace building interventions in the area, what lessons can be drawn from previous attempts to broker and sustain peace among the targeted communities and explain the justifications for why the planned intervention is expected to succeed where others have failed.

ABP Phase II has been informed by the main recommendations of the Phase I evaluation. First, the ABP needs to focus in the areas where the Dinka Bor, Gawaar, Lou Nuer and Murle communities intersect; grievances are high; and violence is organized. Second, the ABP interventions need to be anchored onto the Pieri agreement. Third, women and youth are key to peace promotion and on-going peace processes. Fourth, the recovery of abductees and prevention of abduction build confidence in the ABP and peace process. Fifth, community assets and material support provide incentives for and tools to engage in positive livelihoods and peace promotion efforts. Sixth, a flexible funding mechanism, which was introduced towards the end of the CVR project, is critical to responding to or averting crises. Lastly, to the greatest extent, community needs should be jointly assessed, and interventions should be co-located for maximizing impact.

Phase II will target the areas where the communities of different ethnic groups get into violent conflict, and external support has been minimal or non-existent, thus marginalized areas. They include Kadiang, Weikol-Pulbura corridor, Anyidi-Manyabol-Gumuruk corridor, Nanaam-Bichbich corridor, Keriak-Kotome-Lekuangole corridor and Nyandit-Burmath-Nyargeny corridor. Given highly remote and volatile areas, the ABP will bolster the reconciliation pillar by onboarding Peace Canal in Phase II, which has been participating in the ARG and co-leading the Social Cohesion Sub-Group. The partner will also manage a crisis modifier fund, a flexible mechanism to swiftly respond to emerging and urgent needs such as rapid assessment, shuttle diplomacy, and support to political and community dialogues as well as to close critical operational gaps.

Within the selected areas, the ABP will work with women and youth to form and strengthen protection teams including material support for their mobility and communication. The consortium partners will also intentionally work with armed youth in cattle camps and age-set groups in peace promotion and resilience building; strengthen their livelihoods and life and vocational skills; and together with traditional leaders, local authorities, and women and youth leaders, discourage violence as an economic objective and for social status.

In Phase I, the ABP faced challenges in strengthening formal and informal judiciary systems and linkages between the two. In Phase II, key entry points have already been identified and adequate staffing and resourcing has been allocated to ensure that consortium partners will be better able to strengthen interdependency of the stabilization and other pillars so that the community structures established and strengthened under reconciliation support the promotion of formal and informal judiciary systems and that women and youth participating in resilience activities become aware about and increase confidence in the judiciary systems.

Double and triple nexus programmes come and go in the Jonglei and GPAA sub-region. Increased investments are desired but require strengthened coordination to ensure conflict sensitivity and harmonized approaches to political and community engagement. The ARG will be leveraged to achieve this coordination objective. The ABP will support the ARG to update actor mapping on a regular basis – through the quarterly review sessions – to ensure continuous calibration (layering and sequencing) of all interventions and interface across the pillars.

12. CONSORTIUM RECIPIENT ORGANISATIONS / IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

List all direct recipient organizations and implementing partners (international and local) that are part of the proposed consortium and identify which components of the programme they will be responsible for. Provide a justification for their inclusion within the consortium, based on mandate, experience, local know-how and existing capacity.

Table 4. List of ABP Partners for Phase II

Partner	PUNO/INGO/NGO/ CSO/CBO	Intervention Area	Justification
WFP	PUNO	WFP will be the overall consortium and resilience pillar lead. Its responsibilities will include programme coordination with direct recipient organizations and	WFP is the largest UN agency in South Sudan, delivering life-saving assistance through unconditional provision of food and cash. The organization also supports

		implementing partners; liaison with the RSRTF Secretariat; secretariat function for the ABP Project Coordination and sub-regional ARG in Bor. WFP's programme interventions will fall under the resilience pillar, targeting youth, women and other population groups in the targeted areas.	resilience-building and safety net programmes through malnutrition prevention support, conditional in-kind and cash assistance, cash plus programme, school feeding, agri-food systems development, and the maintenance and construction of enabling infrastructure e.g., feeder road/dyke rehabilitation. Under Phase I of RSRTF Jonglei and GPAA, WFP coordinated the CVR project and led the coordination of the ARG. WFP will continue to leverage its resources and capabilities - such as its footprint, fleet, air assets, analytical/ programme/ operational expertise, network of partners, and relationships with the national, state and local - to lead one unified consortium, coordinate and work with the partners and the government. WFP with its own resources will complement the Phase I implementation to increase accessibility for the consortium partners and coordinate crisis response, including emergency food assistance, if and when needs arise and are agreed with the ARG membership. WFP will support repairs and grading of the road linking Bor-Pibor, Bor-Kadiang and other locations in Jonglei and GPAA and intends to support an expansion of the river transport network to better connect northern and central Jonglei with Malakal.
UNDP	PUNO	Under the stabilization pillar, UNDP's interventions will focus on capacity building (soft skills) of the informal and formal rule of law actors (justice and law enforcement/security), governance structures, women and youth to enhance lawful redress of grievances of victims of violence, increase citizen's trust in the rule of law mechanisms, and improved security and safety all which are complementary to the reconciliation interventions.	UNDP has a comparative advantage of donor funds management, grants and transfers. It has the technical and requisite human resource to implement the proposed programme. It has also capacity to operate in the proposed key geographical areas. Furthermore, the UNDP Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights strengthening programme implemented in 8 states including Jonglei State and GPAA will complement and sustain the efforts under the ABP programme. Through three of its five key outputs: (i) Justice and security institutions coordinate and deliver accountable, effective and equitable services; (ii) The most vulnerable people; particularly women, girls, SGBV survivors, IDPs and returnees have increased equal access to a fair and effective justice system, and (iii) Community security

			especially in conflict-affected areas is people-centred, prevents violence and promotes safety, activities will complement the existing stabilization gaps using the RSRTF project, ensuring that efforts are taken to close the gaps in the justice chain and expand the capacity of justice actors.
IOM	PUNO	IOM's interventions fall under the Resilience Pillar and include engaging armed and at-risk youth in non-formal learning and training, focussing on promotion of life-skills to support economic empowerment and sustain peace and stability in the targeted areas.	IOM has one of the largest UN operational footprints in South Sudan and champions an integrated, multi-sector approach, where migration management and recovery and stabilization efforts complement humanitarian interventions to build community resilience and reduce dependency on humanitarian aid. IOM's Transition and Recovery Unit (TRU) develops programmes that address the root causes of instability and support and conflict in South Sudan through community-based peace building and conflict mitigation strategies to empower communities and support returnees and residents. Current transition and recovery-oriented programmes promote dialogue, boost local economies by facilitating income-generation, construct/rehabilitate key infrastructure and support the dissemination of peace messages and non-biased reporting through mass media and non-formal education.
UNCHR/HRD	PUNO	UNHCR intervention falls under Reconciliation Pillar. The activities are aiming at Reducing violence and intercommunal conflict in Jonglei State and GPAA by preventing the abduction of women and children and facilitating their release and family re-unification	UNHCR is the Protection cluster lead in South Sudan and has vast experience in Refugees and IDPs operation. UNHCR has been implementing massive projects in Emergency response, general protection and interventions as well as implementing sustainable projects for solutions in coordination with Government counterparts and other humanitarian actors. UNHCR Empowers communities to mitigate protection risks and strengthen communities' resilience and peaceful coexistence.
Save the Children International (SCI)	INGO	Abductee prevention and reintegration.	Save the Children has expertise in family tracing and reintegration, case management, and management of interim care centres in liaison with the government, CSO's and other stakeholders.

Peace Canal	NGO	Peace Canal's interventions are oriented around (a) the inter-communal governance structure facilitation of the women's, youth and traditional leaders, respectively; (b) ad hoc community leadership engagements to address issues that arise throughout the process and; (c) punctual interventions decided by the community to strengthen the ongoing process.	Peace Canal's work began in the Area shortly before phase I of the RSRTF (at that time directly delivered under the Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund). It has strong community relationships through its network of 14 locally engaged advisors and project officers covering the area. All are from the areas, and Peace Canal operates an internal triangulation system on design to ensure that implementation remains equitable and conflict sensitive.
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP)	INGO	NP's interventions fall under the Reconciliation Pillar and include engaging communities, with particular attention to youth and women. The interventions are primarily in protection, social cohesion and peace building, as communities are supported to facilitate in the peace process.	NP utilizes a grassroots approach in community engagement. This strengthens the overall objectives of the programme by generating broader ownership and participation from the community. In the Jonglei GPAA region, NP has two existing teams (Pibor and Lankien) in the region which will feed into the proposed programme.
UNMISS RoLAS	PUNO	UNMISS RoLAS interventions will support strengthening community dispute resolutions and building on the linkages between formal and informal justice systems. RoLAS will also support the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms identified by the communities namely the traditional leaders' circuit court.	UNMISS RoLAS brings in its technical advisory on rule of law and accountability. RoLAS will use its expertise to support and capacitate formal and informal justice actors to ensure justice is delivered and inter and intra communal violence is resolved in a peaceful manner. RoLAS intervention is informed by the continuous engagement with formal and informal justice actors in Jonglei and GPAA during Phase I, observations and recommendations from the Evaluation Report, and the research project on perceptions of justice in Jonglei and GPAA carried out in cooperation with the Bridge Network South Sudan during Phase I.
VSF-Germany	INGO	VSF Germany's interventions under the resilience pillar targets men, women and armed youth in cattle camps with skills in livestock care and increased capacity for livelihoods along livestock value chains. These interventions are expected to contribute to the project's ultimate goal of reduction of violence	For over two decades VSF-Germany has, implemented livestock interventions in Jonglei and Greater Upper Nile region. Livestock vaccination and treatment activities are ongoing under BHA funded project covering 9 counties in Jonglei (Akobo, Duk and Twic East, Pibor, Fangak, Ayod, Akobo, Yiror and Uror). Cattle camps provide the primary platform for rolling out those activities.
The Bridge Network of South Sudan	NNGO	Research: Measuring Safety and Security, harmonized needs assessment for the consortium.	Bridge Network rolled-out the MSS methodology in Phase I of the ABP and their work was scaled up in 2022 through WFP internal resources. They play an essential role in gathering indicators/measurement of peace and monitoring contributions to peace

			throughout the programme implementation.

If several organisations with similar mandates and comparable activities are included in the consortium, please justify the division of labour and requirement for inclusion of multiple actors.

Table 5. ABP Division of Labour Per Pillar

Pillar	Pillar Lead	Partners	Division of Labour	Justification
Reconciliation	Peace Canal	Peace Canal, NP, SCI, UNMISS, UNHCR, plus + Implementing Partners	Peace Canal's contribution is to work with the community leadership structures to advance the peace process. NP's contribution is to bring broader community engagement into the peace process. SCI will implement family tracing and reintegration of abductees (FTR) and UNHCR will provide technical support, coordination and advocacy for prevention of abductions.	This division of labour is highly informed by Phase I engagement through the ARG. Peace Canal was a key actor during Phase I, although not a consortium member. Their capabilities were highly reflective throughout the past two years as they engaged with the RSRTF programme collaboratively and in an integrated manner. The other partners demonstrated their ability to deliver during phase I.
Stabilization	UNMIS RoLAS	UNMISS RoLAS, UNDP, UNPOL, UNMISS, The Bridge Network South Sudan	UNMISS RoLAS interventions will support strengthening community dispute resolutions and building on the linkages between formal and informal justice systems. RoLAS will also support the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms identified by the communities in the Pieri Agreement, namely the traditional leaders' circuit court. UNDP will support strengthening and capacitating community-based mechanisms, educating the vulnerable groups on their rights and access to justice mechanisms. In addition, UNDP will strengthen the capacity of formal justice actors for better delivery of justice in accordance with their roles and responsibilities.	Based on the deliberations of the Co-Creation Workshop, partners under the Stabilization Pillar decided on division of labour in a way that would not be duplicative. UNMISS RoLAS would focus on leveraging its technical expertise with regards to intercommunal governance structure meetings and the traditional leaders' circuit court under the Pieri Agreement. UNDP will focus on community-based mechanisms such as PCRCs, Women and Youth Protection Teams, police, and justice mechanisms as well as awareness raising sessions for vulnerable groups on their rights and access to justice mechanisms.

			UNPOL will provide technical advisory and support to the Stabilization Pillar to deliver targeted capacity building trainings to law enforcement and PCRCs. The Bridge Network South Sudan will focus on measuring safety and security by focusing on daily peace indicators and collecting ethnographic data and information to monitor the impact of interventions. Bridge Network will also analyse the context to inform how interventions will be adopted as the context will evolve during Phase II.	
Resilience	WFP	WFP, IOM, VSF-Germany plus + Implementing Partners	WFP's focus will be on addressing hunger as a key driver of conflict, supporting asset creation to reduce marginalization and protecting livelihoods, and skills development to support agro-pastoral livelihoods. Recognizing the high importance of livestock in the project areas, VSF-G will maintain a focus on community-based animal health services, including treatment, vaccination and surveillance. IOM will concentrate on non-formal learning opportunities targeted towards youth, incorporating peace education into basic numeracy and literacy. The three partners aim to ensure beneficiary convergence to the extent possible and will draw the targeted population from within populations supported or identified by partners and structures in reconciliation and stabilization pillars.	The division of responsibilities reflects each organization's strengths and the structure of ABP Phase I: IOM non-formal learning; VSF in livestock, including in transhumance; and WFP in food assistance and community asset creation.

Refer to any planned capacity-building activities for national non-governmental organizations if they are part of the consortium indicating how this will be delivered and by which organisations.


Localization will be strengthened through a) organizational capacity development and strengthening as a function of strategic leadership in the ongoing program design and iteration, not only delivery; and b) incentives for key staff of community-based

structures/mechanisms to compensate them for the opportunity cost of the time invested in leading community governance structures. The crisis modifier fund will include a dedicated and flexible fund to identify and support emerging opportunities for strengthening the localization agenda of Phase II.

13. MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING:

*Refer to supplementary guidance document: **RSRTF Monitoring & Evaluation Guide** and complete supplementary annexes A and Annex B. Here describe how your organization will collect baseline data and monitor the implementation, progress and achievements of the project. In addition, describe how you plan to capture and share lessons learned and how these lessons inform the adaptation of activity implementation over time. Explain if any studies, besides the baseline/end-line assessments are planned.*

Figure 1: Bespoke integrated MEL approach



An integrated Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) approach will be adopted to generate evidence for learning (adaptative programming), accountability and reporting on performance. The M&E system for the ABP leverages on capacities (people, processes, and tools) of the consortium partners to build systems/structures for integrated monitoring, reporting and learning. The M&E system builds on lessons learned from Phase 1 including need for strengthening M&E capacities for partners, requirement for additional resources for M&E (dedicated M&E Officer, monitoring and learning activities), and need for M&E integration through joint planning and implementation of monitoring activities, and establishing an M&E Working Group to enhance coordination of M&E activities.

RSRTF Phase I endline results/achievements/milestones will be used as baseline for indicators where activities will be continued in the same locations that RSRTF targeted. For new indicators, baseline surveys will be jointly planned and conducted to ensure efficient use of resources. All baseline surveys will be conducted and completed within 3 months of the programme inception and will be consolidated as one joint assessment.

The project will build on learnings from the Measuring Safety and Security (MSS) methodology utilized in Phase I. Community based indictors to measure perceptions of safety and security were developed and baseline through a WFP Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) survey. Indicators were expanded in April 2022 to cover additional communities targeted for social cohesion and Food for Assets interventions (albeit through separate funding) in Uror, Nyirol and Ulang. The indicators were surveyed three times (November 2021, June 2022, and November 2022). Furthermore, ethnographic diaries were conducted bi-monthly throughout 2022. While according to original proposal timeline, the outcomes of the November 2022 PDM survey could have formed the baseline for Phase II, partners will now use the ongoing Community Re-engagement Initiative to ensure that indicators are still relevant, as well as whether the MSS methodology needs to be further fine-tuned to capture all necessary data. As such, the next PDM survey (scheduled for June 2022) will likely form the baseline for Phase II.

The MEL function of ABP Phase II will be coordinated by the M&E Officer, seated within the Programme Management Team, supported by the MEL Working Group (MEL WG) comprising of M&E leads or focal points of the consortium partners. Area-based sub-working groups of the MEL WG will be comprised of the consortium partners of the reconciliation, stabilization, and resilience pillars. The MEL WG will collectively ensure that MEL activities are jointly planned and timely implemented and aligned to the theory of change and the results framework.

Output indicators will be tracked on monthly basis and reported on quarterly basis. Innovative tools will be developed for the purpose of collection, consolidation and visualization. The M&E Officer will consolidate partner reports and provide quality review feedback. Monthly output reports will feed into a consolidated quarterly results framework which will be included in the programme quarterly progress report. There will be quarterly programme review meeting to take stock of progress towards planned targets, identify M&E bottlenecks, and provide evidence to inform decision making on programme adaptation. The quarterly review/learning meetings provide useful information for the annual RSRTF cross-partner learning workshop. Periodic thematic surveys and studies will be conducted to collect data to measure outcome level indicators. Outcome milestones will also be captured in the indicator tracker which will be accessible to all consortium partners. Furthermore, other MEL products will be produced to complement quarterly reports and disseminated to stakeholders such as joint baseline surveys and studies, bulletins, updates, and op-eds for media publication.

Building on the lessons of RSRTF Phase I, the MEL WG will organize periodic information and knowledge sharing and capacity building activities (e.g., brown bags, development and synthesis of guidelines and tools and other experience sharing sessions) for the ABP M&E focal persons. The MEL WG will conduct joint field monitoring missions to take stock of progress in activity implementation, harvest results attributable to the interventions, and assess the extent to which evidence is used for adaptative programming. In addition, the MEL WG will provide inputs to the design of tools for data collection of everyday peace indicators (EPI, and review and disseminate evidence on EPI. Moreover, the MEL WG will support the RSRTF secretariat to design and implement an independent end of programme evaluation. Specifically, the MEL WG will support the consortium to closely collaborate with the Secretariat by providing feedback on the evaluation ToR, forming an evaluation committee, facilitating field work, and reviewing evaluation deliverables.

14. MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

Provide an organigram depicting the consortium structure, proposed programme staff, as well as accountability and reporting lines. Describe the project supervision, reporting lines and distribution of labour that the implementing partner will put in place to manage the successful implementation of the project (e. clear definition of management responsibilities, clear arrangements for coordination of implementation across different stakeholders, financial management arrangement etc). Explain the consortium management and coordination structure(s) and processes envisaged, including the membership structure of programme governing bodies, their main roles and responsibilities, and frequency of meetings.

One unified consortium will be comprised of 9 member organizations and led by WFP. The ABP Programme Management Team (PMT) will be based in the WFP Bor Field Office and supported by the WFP Juba Head Office management and technical units. The PMT will be staffed with the Programme Coordinator (PC), the M&E Officer, and the Information Management Officer. The PC will report to the Head of WFP Bor Field Office and supervise the M&E Officer and the Information Management Officer. The PMT will coordinate with and be supported by various units within the Bor Field Office for programme coordination, subnational engagement, and administration. The PC will have a direct link to the RSRTF Secretariat for day-to-day communication and operational follow up. The WFP partnership and programme management will liaise with the Secretariat for strategic and contractual matters. See Annex 6: ABP Organigram.

A Project Board will be established, including senior level management representatives from each partner organisation. This Board will senior-level strategic engagement of implementing partners and key stakeholders to ensure effective and accountable interventions and support high-level political engagement when required. The Board will also act as referral mechanisms for disputes or other issues that cannot be resolved at the ARG level. The PC will provide secretariat support to the Board and ARG. The Project Board will be chaired by the WFP Deputy Country Director and convened every six months to review programme implementation vis-à-vis the RSRTF overall strategy and ABP objectives and targets. The ARG will meet monthly for information updates, operational coordination and strategic discussions on political engagement. ARG pillar working groups will meet more regularly for day-to-day harmonization of activity implementation.

For the purpose of accountability and reporting, the consortium partners will be divided into direct recipients (9 organizations) and implementing partners. Each direct recipient will receive funds from the RSRTF including for its implementing partner/s and will be responsible for narrative and financial reporting through WFP to the Secretariat. The direct recipients will be accountable for financial management of implementing partners. Each direct recipient and implementing partner will have a programme focal person, who will liaise with the PMT. The PMT and partners will have coordination meetings. For evidence generation and learning, each direct recipient and implementing partner will have an M&E Officer or focal person for the concerned partners part of the ABP, who will coordinate with the consortium members through the M&E WG (reference: section 13).

Table 6: ABP Consortium Funds Disbursement Mechanism

Direct Recipient	Implementing Partners	Pillar and Activities
1. WFP	Oxfam	Resilience
	The Bridge Network	Reconciliation and M&E
2. IOM	n/a	Resilience
3. UNHCR	n/a	Reconciliation
4. UNMISS RoLAS	n/a	Stabilization
5. UNDP	n/a	Stabilisation
	6. NP	Reconciliation and Stabilisation
	7. VSF-Germany	Resilience
	8. Peace Canal	Reconciliation
	9. SCI	Reconciliation

During ABP Phase II, new forms of coordination will be introduced to adopt a more collective programme structure. The needs assessment of the programme will incorporate the requirements of all partners into one assessment (i.e., CBPP) which will implemented by the Bridge Network. The programme will also generate a guideline on community engagement, which will increase accountability and anchor activities on the needs of the community.

The consortium will improve communication and information sharing and adopt a more transparent and collaborative approach to meaningfully achieve integration of all pillars in Phase I. First, a standard communication platform will be used systematically by all partners. Second, a shared security and incident reporting mechanism will be adopted to enhance conflict sensitivity and credibility in our information assessment. Third, the partners in the same area of operation will conduct joint monthly planning to maximize efficiency, resource use, and impact of the activities. Before traveling to a site, the partner will reach out to others on the ground to ensure the former's planned activities will not conflict with activities planned by another consortium partner or other actors. Fourth, all partners will upload their activity planning and tracking into a collective calendar. Lastly, all relevant project documents will be uploaded to a collective SharePoint, including partner specific documentation and project deliverables.

To enhance accountability vis-à-vis of the coordination mechanisms, the consortium will undertake quarterly assessments and feedback surveys on the partners' ability to coordinate within the consortium (within and between pillars, as well as with the consortium lead). Routine feedback to the PMT on a quarterly basis will be instituted to allow all partners to share their expectations on coordination and programme results. The PMT will be responsible for identifying and communicating gaps, inefficiencies and duplications.

15. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY / EXIT STRATEGY

Describe the role of local actors, authorities and communities in determining the project/programme design. How will they continue to be involved to nurture community accountability and ownership and ensure the project results are sustained? Explain the programme's exit strategy to ensure that activities can be wrapped up at the end of the programme duration, either through sustainability measures, handovers to community structures or local authorities, agreements with other donors for follow-up funding or end of activities which do not need further support. If support from other donors is expected, explain what the programme will do to try to ensure this support from the start.

The sustainability and exist strategy of the RSRTF Jonglei and GPAA ABP is based on the premise that the ABP is a short-term catalytic nexus programme with the primary objective of violence reduction and that the peace dividends generated are meant to open space for and attract other longer-term recovery and development investments to shift from negative to positive peace building and strengthen governance/state-building, social services and economic activities for the population in the subregion. Thus, by the end of Phase II, the consortium will have reached a point where mechanisms – institutions and informal structures (e.g. groups, committees, etc.) are established, equipped and functioning (with external support or fully self-sustaining) and that the community perceives benefits of the mechanisms and has confidence in them for safety or protection, information and

knowledge, safety net, livelihood opportunities, and peacebuilding. This is the central piece of the Phase II sustainability and exist strategy.

Based on achievements and lessons learnt in Phase I, the ABP will establish community-based mechanisms (e.g., WPTs, YPTs and EWERs) and local government structures, where they do not exist, and strengthen existing ones with the consortium members and in coordination and collaboration with government and non-government actors. The consortium members will approach targeted populations and communities not only as beneficiaries and participants but also as partners to achieve the programme objectives of violence reduction and peace dividends. Community-driven planning will form part of the programme implementation strategy, which will strengthen local ownership, support localisation and ensure sustainability.

Proposed interventions will focus on the transfer of knowledge and skills to the community-based mechanisms and local administration to ensure that the formed or strengthened structures are adequately prepared to manage subnational violence, promote livelihood activities that yield peace dividends and promote economic opportunities. Community-based engagement and consultations through the protection teams, chiefs, commissioners and employing community participatory planning models will be indications of the project sustainability agenda. The consortium partners will engage local authorities in planning and implementation of activities.

The programme will take into consideration the below approaches as part of its sustainability and exit strategy:

1. Engagement and participation of local actors and communities in programme design and implementation
2. Strengthening of local peace structures through capacity building: transfer of knowledge and skills to community-based organisations, CBOs, and structures that are catalyst to violence prevention and peace building
3. Community driven approaches and initiatives in the implementation of programme activities (e.g., visual aids, drama, and other adaptive approaches in training and other capacity building efforts)
4. Involvement of local communities from the outset in the prioritization of their community needs to ensure their needs and priorities are identified and addressed
5. Linking community-based structures members with livelihood enhancement activities
6. Strengthening traditional and formal justice and reconciliation mechanisms within the framework of accountability
7. Localisation of the ARG by cascading it in strategic field locations and by encouraging the State Ministry of peacebuilding, County authorities and key actors that are pertinent to reconciliation, stabilisation and resilience interventions in Jonglei and GPAA to join the coordination platform.
8. Establishment and enforcement of community feedback mechanisms by the consortium partners and subnational structures.

With these considerations in mind, the ABP will produce a first draft outline of an exit strategy in the first six months, and this will be reviewed and progressively refined as the program moves towards the exit stages. A budget has been reserved for dedicated exit strategy interventions. It is important to note that some of these interventions may take place relatively early, with a gradual ramping up of effective measures in the final 6-9 months of programming.

Using a Risk Analysis Risk Reduction matrix, identify potential threats (any event that can affect staff, programme and/or reputation) that might affect the implementation.

List indicators signifying the increasing chance of realisation of the identified threat, and the external and internal points of vulnerability that could trigger or aggravate the threat.

List the measures to be implemented, both mitigations to prevent the threat materialising and contingency to reduce the impact if it does, explain if the measures are in place or to be implemented. Finally, describe and rate the residual risk for the individuals, the programs and the assets and define if this residual risk is acceptable or not for the organisation.

Table 7. Risk and Mitigation Matrix

Threat	Indicators of Change	Vulnerability (Who, What, When, from Whom)	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation and Contingency	Residual Risk after M&C	RR Acceptable? (Y / N)
Event type (e.g., crossfire, armed robbery)	*External factors that could indicate an increase of likelihood of the event occurring (e.g., increased militarisation in the area, closure of shops)*	*Who: potential perpetrators* *Whom: potential target* *What: potential modus operandi* *When: potential time of occurrence* *Where: potential location of occurrence*	*Internal triggering factors that could increase the likelihood of the event to happen (e.g., perception of organization as wealthy, regular movements to same destination)*	*Internal aggravating factors that could increase the impact of the event if happening (e.g., more people in a car; lack of health facilities with surgical capacity in the area)*	*Listing of mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood (to be linked with triggering factors) and their status (e.g., change of movement plan every week, draft)* *+ contingency measures to reduce the impact (to be linked with aggravating factors) and their status (e.g., medevac plan, written and shared)*	*Rating the residual risk on programs/individuals/assets* *Negligible* *Minor* *Moderate* *Severe* *Critical*	*Determine if the residual risk is acceptable for the organization (if no, no implementation or interruption of implementation)*
High levels of national-level violence and manipulation of armed youths by political elites	Breakdown and/or failure of the peace agreement; UNMISS reporting on higher levels of national	Who: National political factions and respective armed entities.	Political stalemates and failure to successfully negotiate implementation of the peace agreement would increase the likelihood.	The scale and spread of such violence would have significant programming impact across the UN system.	Emphasising community ownership of the peace process and progressive detachment from national level interests and instrumentalization. Underlining the underlying 'democratic' process of the program and building agency.	Moderate. The second year of Phase 02 will be most susceptible to this risk as the momentum increases towards elections.	Yes, as programming needs in Jonglei and GPAA are urgent and violence levels in the regions are already high.

	(political) violence.	Whom: National and non-national populations. What: General violence (war), targeted killings. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.					
High levels of localised violence, to include violence instigated by regional and/or national actors.	Partner reporting on higher levels of local and national (political) violence.	Who: Local political factions and respective armed entities; armed youth groups. Whom: National and non-national populations. What: Armed conflict and crime, targeted killings, revenge killings. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Further breakdowns of leadership and governance roles and responsibilities; political breakdowns; desperation of population. Inequitable targeting of populations by RSRTF could also increase the risk.	Impact will be determined by geographical scope of violence, and frequency, but is likely to be high.	Programmatically encouraging communities to separate out issues and engage on the vectors of conflict that specifically affect them. Respond immediately to threats of mobilisation. Ensure that targeting of populations is via community consultation and regularly checked for conflict sensitivity.	Moderate. Phase II implementation of the project would be most at risk in such a case, as projects may need to be stopped before completion or subject to destruction in the case of escalated cycles of violence.	Yes, as programming needs in Jonglei and GPAA are urgent and violence levels in the regions are already high.

Compliance with protection principles	Violation of policies against sexual exploitation and abuse by staff of implementing agencies and preventable negative effects of programme activities	Programme participants	Less likely	low	Protection principles of 'do no harm' and conflict sensitivity will be incorporated into programme design and reviews and action taken in a timely manner			Minor: there increased awareness among implementing partners about policies on safeguarding programme participants against SEA. The ARG platform provides regular context updates and conflict sensitivity issues are highlighted and addressed accordingly.	Yes
Blockage of ABP activities by local programme participants	Increased cases of access blockage, programme disruptions caused by labour disputes and threats to programme assets and staff	Local youth Relocatable staff Humanitarian convoys on key access roads e.g. Bor-Kadiang, Bor-Pibor	Likely especially in Pibor where there is a mismatch between local skill set and demand for access to employment opportunities by local youth with limited options for livelihoods	Disruptions on Bor-Kadiang road often leads to blockage of Bor-Pibor road	Youth on both sides will be engaged in mutually beneficial activities to prevent any disruptions related to criminal activities on roads and perceptions of bias and marginalisation in service delivery and recruitment of staff.	Moderate	yes		
Extreme levels of food insecurity	WFP reporting on food security.	Who: Community members. Whom: Community members. What: Natural scarcity and/or scarcity resulting from man-made causes. When: 24/7.	Violence and natural disasters will increase the likelihood of food scarcity.	Extreme food scarcity may have an impact on the physical and psychological ability of community members to engage in project activities.	Food provision will be undertaken by WFP in connection with the project. Nascent progress on the stability of the operating environment will also allow general cultivation to take place, alongside FFA programming			Moderate. WFP programming should address some urgent needs, but resourcing is not comprehensive for emergency assistance and gaps are likely, community perception of gaps almost certain.	Yes, the intervention will help address the risk.

		Where: All locations.					
Logistical constraints (e.g., impassable roads, flooding)	Partner reporting on conditions.	Who: National disasters compounded by inadequate disaster response capabilities. Whom: National and non-national populations. What: Rain, erosion. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	These conditions are highly likely as they characterise the environment.	Project activities may be significantly delayed or difficult to implement.	Programming will be scheduled to avoid high-risk times (e.g., rainy season) and conditions will be monitored. Asset creation will be biased towards access improvement.	Moderate. Logistical constraints may increase costs associated with transport as well as project implementation.	Yes, the obstacles may delay and make programming more difficult, but this is an acceptable risk.
Divergence of government and RSRTF approaches	Government disengagement / negative private and/or public statements regarding RSRTF	Who: State and National Government Actors Whom: RSRTF partners What: Conflict insensitive interventions When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	At present, in both positive and negative ways, the government is heavily reliant on cooperation with partners for resourcing. If govt internal resourcing increases substantially, this may lead to more divergence.	If approaches diverged, it would like result in undermining of RSRTF activities across the board and attempts at intimidation.	Strongly emphasising adherence to political engagement strategy, especially collective engagement approaches. Maintaining positive relationships with communities to ensure positive contribution of partners remains salient.	Minor. In view of minimal government resources and no imminent sign of substantive fiscal and fiduciary reforms, the government will likely maintain a strong incentive for cooperation with partners, although resistance and friction will likely persist at times.	Yes


Internal coordination failures lead to blockages and delays	Internal Partner feedback on coordination system	Who: RSRTF partners Whom: Communities What: Siloed programming / not sharing information and coordinating. When: 24/7. Where: All locations.	Highly likely unless coordination systems are explicitly agreed and regularly reviewed.	Community scepticism of RSRTF commitments and disengagement from the process / unwillingness to meet	Coordinator emphasises system for coordination / results framework incentivises coordination. Written agreement. Presenting to community as far as possible as RSRTF not individual partner identity	Moderate. Short timeline for preparation of approach, partner selection etc means scope for misunderstandings and assumptions remains high.	Yes

ANNEX 1: RESULTS FRAMEWORK


ANNEX 2: WORKPLAN

ANNEX 3: FINANCIAL PROPOSAL


ANNEX 4: PROBLEM TREE



ANNEX 5: THEORY OF CHANGE (TOC)



ANNEX 6: ORGANIGRAM



ANNEX 7: CONFLICT HOTSPOTS MAP

